Market Puzzles

 

“People who work crossword puzzles know that if they stop making progress, they should put the puzzle down for a while.” — Marilyn vos Savant, listed in the Guinness Book of World Records under “Highest IQ” from 1986 to 1989 and entered the Guinness Book of World Records Hall of Fame in 1988.

 

English engraver and cartographer John Spilsbury is said to have invented jigsaw puzzles during the second half of the eighteenth century. He was concerned, allegedly, with promoting a new way of teaching geography. We suspect, he is unlikely to have envisioned how his invention would evolve to become a form of entertainment for the masses.

 

Jigsaw puzzles as a form of entertainment for adults emerged around the start of the twentieth century and by 1908 a full-blown jigsaw craze had started in the United States which quickly spread across the Atlantic to Britain, and then around the world. The trend is said to have started in Newport, before spreading to New York, Boston and abroad. Adults across all rungs, except the very lowest, of society were sucked into the craze and puzzles became a primary form of entertainment in high society house parties in Newport and other country retreats. Although the fever eventually subsided, puzzles remained a regular source of adult amusement for the next two decades.

 

The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 coincided with a resurgence in the popularity of jigsaw puzzles. Sales are estimated to have peaked in early 1933 at a remarkable 10 million units per week. Puzzles, it seems, offered an escape from the financial woes of the times, as well as providing a sense of accomplishment during a time when jobs were hard to come by.

 

For us, price charts and evolving relationships between macroeconomic variables are  the pieces of a puzzle we are continuously striving to put together in order to have a clearer picture of the market.

 

In this week’s piece we run through some charts and macroeconomic relationships that dominate our thinking at the moment.

 

US Credit Flows and the US Dollar

 

 

Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the year-over-year change in the broad measure of US  money supply, M2, was a very good proxy for trading the US dollar. Essentially, if the expectations were of credit to flow at a faster clip in the US economy, it paid to be long the dollar. If one the other hand, if the expectations were of credit conditions to tighten, it was better to be short the dollar.

 

The chart below plots an adjusted measure of year-of-year growth in broad US money supply, with the US dollar index, $DXY. The relationship worked swimmingly till the run up to the financial crisis. Following the crisis, there has been a disconnect that has largely remained.

 

DXYM2 wo ER

 

What we think changed following the crisis is broad money supply no longer being a suitable proxy for the flow of credit in the US economy. And the source of that change was the Fed’s large scale asset purchases in response to the financial crisis. The purchases were funded through the increase in reserve balances in excess of regulatory reserve minimum requirements. Essentially, the growth in the broad money supply following the crisis was not translating into increases in the flow of credit because banks were parking money with the Fed.

 

The below chart further adjusts the money supply time series for increases and decreases in the supply of excess reserves — the year-over-year growth (decline) in excess reserves is deducted (added) from (to) M2 to obtain a better estimate of the flow of credit in the US economy.

 

DXYM2 w ER

We think this chart captures the recent resilience of the US dollar. Although credit in its traditional forms, as depicted in the first chart, has remained tight, the draw down of excess reserves due to quantitative tightening has supported broad money supply growth. This in turn has been, we think, supportive of the greenback.

 

Given this adjusted metric, we can now hypothesise on the ways forward for the dollar.

 

For now, given the Fed’s intention to stop shrinking its balance sheet from September onward, the dollar’s continued resilience will hinge upon other sources of growth in credit. The reemergence of President Trump’s infrastructure bill could be one such source — should it materialise, it is likely to draw capital to the US from the rest of the world and push the dollar to new highs. Till it transpires, however, the risk-to-reward ratio is not in favour of dollar bulls.

 

Large scale infrastructure spending in the US may also be the scenario under which commodities and the dollar strengthen in sync while US Treasuries do poorly.

 

 

Emerging Markets

 

Given the crackdown on shadow banking in China, the waxing and waning of Chinese shadow financing is no longer a primary driver of emerging markets.

 

MXEF Index (MSCI Emerging Market 2019-04-11 15-37-39.png

 

Standalone and relative to the S&P 500, emerging markets do not look bearish at an aggregate level.

 

MXEF Index (MSCI Emerging Market 2019-04-11 15-38-38

 

Russia is increasingly looking like the market to own in emerging markets. (The bottom panel is the MSCI Russia Index relative to the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.)

 

MXRU Index (MSCI Russia Index) R 2019-04-11 15-55-30.png

 

The gains in oil this year, however, have not fully been reflected in the Russian equity market’s performance. (The bottom panel is the MSCI Russia Index relative to WTI crude.)

 

MXRU Index (MSCI Russia Index) R 2019-04-11 16-54-28.png

 

While those long $ARGT should be looking to sell into Argentina’s inclusion into the MSCI Emerging Markets Index at the end of May.

 

ARGT US Equity (Global X MSCI Ar 2019-04-11 15-56-57.png

 

London-based emerging markets asset manager, Ashmore Group $ASHM.LN, has had a great run even relative to the emerging markets index. It is up 30.3% year-to-date in US dollar terms.

 

ASHM LN Equity (Ashmore Group PL 2019-04-11 16-02-52.png

 

Long Term Yields in China and the US

 

The below chart compares China’s purchasing managers’s index (advanced by three months) to the yield on 10 year Chinese government bonds.

 

Despite China’s inclusion into global bond benchmarks and record foreign inflows, yields are no longer moving lower suggesting that long-term yields in China may have bottomed — the recent pickup in PMI indicates as much as well. If yields have bottomed, or close to it, it is also likely that economic activity in China, too, is set to pick up.

 

GCNY10YR Index (China Govt Bond 2019-04-11 16-17-13

 

Long-term yields in China have over the last decade largely mirrored movements of long term yields in the US. If Chinese yields have bottomed and economic activity is picking up, we would not be surprised to see US long-term yields move higher from here as well.

GCNY10YR Index (China Govt Bond 2019-04-11 16-13-38

 

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed

 

Investment Themes and Considerations for 2019

 

“Every man is the smith of his own fortune.” – Iranian proverb

“Time is like a sword: if you don’t cut it, it cuts you.” – Arabic proverb

Contents

  • Global Liquidity
    • Enhancers
    • Depressants
  • Investment Themes
    • Infrastructure Diplomacy: The Answer to the Rest-of-the-World’s Under Performance?
    • US Dollar: What Will the US Treasury Do?
    • China: Incrementally Better, Not Worse
    • Emerging Markets: Relief Not Reprieve
    • Semiconductors: Led On the Way Down, To Lead On the Way Up?
    • Saudi Arabia: Emerging Market Indices Inclusion
  • Outsiders for Outsized Returns
    • Triunfo Albicelestes
    • Data Driven Dystopia: “The monetization of every move you make”
  • Books
    • Five We Have Read and Recommend
    • Five from Our 2019 Reading List

Note: Our comparable piece from 2018 can be found here.

This post runs quite long, if you prefer you can click here to download the PDF.

 

Global Liquidity

 

As we reflect back on 2018, the year, in a capital markets context, was defined, in our view, by the charging and retarding forces acting upon global liquidity. On the one hand we had the tax reform driven liquidity enhancers, on the other a host of liquidity depressants, including monetary policy driven tightening, pseudo-capital controls under the guise of anti-graft measures, rising interest rates and high oil prices.

In the words of Thomas Joplin, the nineteenth century British banker and merchant,  “A demand for money in ordinary times, and demand for it in periods of panic, are diametrically different. The one demand is for money to put into circulation; the other for money to be taken out of it”.

Last January, with global stock markets off to their best start in more than three decades, the world was in the midst of demand for money to be put into circulation far outstripping demand for it to be taken out of circulation. From October through to the end of the year, as markets witnessed a sharp sell-off, demand to take money out far outweighed the demand to put it back. While in the intervening months between January and October, dominance waxed and waned between the two opposing forces.

 

Enhancers

One of the leading sources of liquidity in 2018 was US companies’ accelerated contributions to their respective defined-benefit pension schemes. The Republican Party’s tax reforms gave American corporations till mid-September of last year to benefit from the higher 35 per cent corporate tax rate when deducting their pension plan contributions from their tax bill. US Companies making contributions through mid-September and deducting them from the prior year’s tax return is not new. The difference last year was that the value of the deduction fell to 21 per cent following the mid-September deadline.

Pension plan contributions by companies in the Russell 3000 Index are estimated to have topped US dollars 90 billion through mid-September last year – more than 10 times the contributions made the year before.

The other major source of liquidity was also motivated by US tax reforms. The reforms, by subjecting US corporations’ offshore profits to a one-time tax of 15.5 per cent on cash and 8 per cent on non-cash or illiquid assets, eliminated the incentive to keep money offshore. In response, US multinationals are estimated to have repatriated more than US dollars 500 billion last year, a significant portion of which went toward share buybacks. The flow of money was not evenly spread throughout the year, however. Corporations repatriated the vast majority of the funds in first half of the year with the amount of cash being brought back dropping off sharply in the second half of the year.

 

Depressants

There were many forces working to suck liquidity out of and impede the flow of capital through the global monetary system.

1. Oil and US Interest Rates

Arguably the US dollar and oil are the two most important ‘commodities’ in the world. One lubricates the global monetary system and the other fuels everything else. Barring a toppling of the US dollar hegemony or till such time when the dominance of oil as the world’s primary energy resource diminishes meaningfully, the global economy is unlikely to enjoy prolonged and synchronised economic growth in an environment in which US interest rates are rising and oil prices are high.

In the more than 30 years between end of May 1988 through December 2018, the US 10-year treasury yield and the oil price have simultaneously been above their respective 48-month moving averages for less than a fifth of the time. And only on six occasions have the two prices remained above their respective 48-month moving averages for 5 or more consecutive months. (The periods when both prices are about their respective 48-month moving averages are highlighted in grey in the two charts below.)

US 10-year Treasury Yield 10YSource: Bloomberg

West Texas Intermediate Crude Price per BarrelOilSource: Bloomberg

2. Policy Driven Tightening

The two dominant liquidity centres of the world, the US and China, moved in 2018 to rein in animal spirits and tighten monetary conditions.

In China, the Communist Party’s, in a bid to bridle systemic risks, clamped down on shadow finance. The tightening of credit conditions, however, has thrown up an interesting twist: interest rates, as opposed to increasing as would be expected, have declined.

China Shadow Financing Growth Year-over-YearChina Shadow FinanceSource: Bloomberg

In the US, the Treasury upped issuance of short-term debt to replace maturing long-term bonds just as long-term issues were being worked off the Fed’s balance sheet through quantitative tightening.

The potential ramifications of quantitative tightening and increased Treasury bill issuance bubbling under the surface are difficult to assess. In a monetary system governed by the hitherto untested Basel III framework and the many policy tweaks enacted by the Fed, such as money market fund reform and setting the interest on excess reserves below the upper band of the feds fund rate, following the Global Financial Crisis, it is difficult to grasp what, if any, hiccups there will be in the transmission of monetary policy as the Fed continues to drain reserves from the banking sector.

Nonetheless, the tightening policies employed by the Fed and the People’s Bank of China, have squeezed global liquidity. Using year-over-year growth in money supply (M2) across the US, China and Europe, as a proxy, we can see global liquidity growth fell to multi-decade lows in 2018.

Global Money Supply Growth vs. MSCI ACWI and EM Indices Money SupplySources: Bloomberg, European Central Bank

3. Anti-Graft

A number of governments across the world have, in recent years, taken drastic measures to crackdown on corruption and the outflow of illicit funds from within their borders. We share a few examples below.

India

In 2016, in a bid to curtail corruption and weaken its shadow economy, the Indian government announced the demonetisation of all Indian rupees 500 and 1,000 banknotes. It also announced the issuance of new Indian rupees 500 and 2,000 banknotes in exchange for the demonetised banknotes. What transpired following the announcement was as, if not more, surprising than the government’s demonetisation scheme: an estimated 93 per cent of the old notes made into the banking system.

With most of the notes flowing into the banking system, they were now unsullied, legal tender. And little need for capital to flow out of India illegally through the hawala system to be held out of reach of the government remains.

Saudi Arabia

In November 2017, the Saudi government famously rounded up, amongst others, wealthy Saudi businessmen, government officials and members of the royal family in the glitzy Ritz Carlton hotel in Riyadh as part of its anti-corruption campaign. Little of what transpired within the boundaries of the five-star hotel has been confirmed by official reports. We do, however, know that billions of dollars of assets moved from private asset pools to the Saudi government’s coffers.

China

China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, has been pursuing a far-reaching campaign against corruption. Since the campaign started in 2012, Chinese authorities have investigated more than 2.7 million officials and punished more than 1.5 million people, including seven national-level leaders and two dozen high-ranking generals.

As governments across the world have cracked down on corruption and elicited the support of regulators across global financial centres, price insensitive bids for real estate across New York City, London, Sydney and Vancouver have started to dry up. The best gauge of the liquidity impact of the anti-graft measures described above, we think, is Dubai. Long a magnet for Russian, Chinese, Indian, Saudi and Iranian capital, amongst others, Dubai had one of worst performing equity markets globally in 2018.

Dubai Financial Market General Index DFMSource: Bloomberg

In summary, as the forces propelling global liquidity petered out over the course of last year, the squeezes on liquidity overwhelmed global financial markets taking down one market after the other, culminating with the dramatic end to the long-running US equity bull market in December.

 

Investment Themes

 

Infrastructure Diplomacy: The Answer to the Rest-of-the-World’s Under Performance?

 One time series that has intrigued us over recent weeks and months is that of the ratio of MSCI All Cap World Ex-US Index (RoWI) to the S&P 500 Index (SPX). The chart below is a plot of the month-end ratio of the two indices from December 1987 through December 2018. (A rising line indicates the RoWI is outperforming the SPX while a falling line indicates the SPX is outperforming the RoWI.)

Superimposed on the chart are the Fibonacci projection levels based on the relative high of the RoWI, occurring in July 1988, and cyclical low of the ratio recorded in October 1992. (You can learn more about Fibonacci projections here.)

Ratio of the MSCI All Cap World Index Ex-US to the S&P 500 IndexROWUSSource: Bloomberg

From a long-term perspective, the drastic under performance of equity markets in the rest-of-the-world relative to the US equity market is obvious. Looking at the above chart, however, we cannot help but feel that a cyclical upturn for the rest-of-the-world is due.

The question then is: What would prompt a correction in the secular trend? We think the answer is a ramp up in global infrastructure investment led by infrastructure diplomacy programmes.

The most marketed, and some might say most notorious, infrastructure diplomacy programme is China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative encompasses the construction of two broad networks spanning four continents:

  • The “Silk Road Economic Belt”: A land based transportation network combined with industrial corridors along the path of the Old Silk Road that linked China to Europe; and
  • The “Maritime Silk Road”: A network of new ports and trade routes to develop three ocean-based “blue economic passages” which will connect Asia with Africa, Oceania and Europe

The Belt and Road Initiative, however, is not the only global infrastructure investment program in existence today. In 2015, worried by China’s growing influence in Asia, Japan first unveiled its “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative as a US dollar 110 billion investment programme targeting Asian infrastructure projects. In 2016, the initiative was expanded to US dollars 200 billion and to include Africa and the South Pacific.

In October 2018, the US Senate joined the US House of Representatives in passing the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development bill (or Build Act), a bipartisan bill creating a new US development agency –  the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). The passing of the Build Act is being hailed by many as the most important piece of US soft power legislation in more than a decade.

The USIDFC has been created with the goal of “crowding in” vitally needed private sector investment in low and lower-middle income countries. The agency, endowed with US dollars 60 billion in funding, is being positioned as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has at times been described as nothing more than “debt trap diplomacy”.

We think if the three distinct initiatives propel infrastructure investment across the developing economies and help them integrate into the global economy, create jobs and gain access to much needed hard currency, the rest-of-the-world can once again enjoy a prolonged period of out performance.

Investors, particularly those with an investment horizon of at least three years, should gradually reduce exposure to the US and reallocate it to the rest-of-the-world.

  

US Dollar: What Will the US Treasury Do?

When the US Treasury issues bills and increases its cash balances in the Treasury General Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it inadvertently tightens monetary conditions in the global banking system.

For the period starting September 2017 through April 2018, the US Treasury did just that. It increased cash balances with the Fed from under US dollars 67 billion at the end of August 2017 to US dollars 403 billion by end of April 2018. (At the end of last year, cash balances with the Fed stood at US dollars 368 billion.)

The increase in the US Treasury’s cash balances was offset by the loss of an equivalent amount of reserves and / or deposits by the US banking system.  Thereby tightening monetary conditions and reducing the availability of US dollars.

The last time the US government faced the prospect of a shutdown, the US Treasury started drawing funds from its cash balances with the Fed to pay for entitlements and other government expenditures. The US Treasury’s Cash balances held with the Fed went from US dollars 422 billion at the end of the October 2016 down to US dollars 63 billion by the end of March 2017. The release of US dollars into the global banking system provided much needed relief, stimulated global risk appetite and weakened the greenback.

 

US Treasury General Account vs. US Dollar Index $DXY TGASources: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve

 

With the US government shutdown triggered by President Trump entering its third week and with little sign of progress in talks between the Democrats and the Republicans, the US Treasury may once again have to draw down on its cash balances with the Fed. If this does transpire and is similar in scale to the previous draw down, it could again stimulate risk appetite and weaken the US dollar.

We are bearish on the near-term (six to nine month) prospects of the US dollar.

 

China: Incrementally Better, Not Worse

 The year has barely started and the People’s Bank of China has already announced the first reserve ratio (RRR) cut of the year, a full percentage point reduction. Unlike previous RRR cuts in 2018, the latest move is a two-step reduction, effective on January 15 and January 25.

This RRR cut will release approximately Chinese yuan 1.5 trillion in liquidity, part of which will replace maturing medium-term lending facilities during the first quarter. On a net basis, the cut is equivalent to Chinese yuan 800 billion in easing.

On the fiscal stimulus side, the government has already approved new rail projects amounting to US dollars 125 billion over the course of the last month. Beijing refrained from stepping up fiscal spending in 2018. With a slowing economy and the on-going trade dispute with the US, however, the government appears to have greater willingness to loosen the purse strings in 2019.

Beijing, in a bid to shore up credit creation, is even allowing local governments to bring forward debt issuance.

Manufacturing data coming out of China is likely to get worse before it gets better – a hangover from US companies’ accelerated orders to build inventories ahead of the initial 1 January deadline for tariff increases. Nonetheless, given that the official policy stance has now tilted towards easing, we expect Chinese economic activity to improve, not worsen over the course of 2019.

Throw in the prospect of MSCI quadrupling the inclusion factor of Chinese A-shares in its emerging markets index and there is a strong possibility Chinese A-Shares break out of their bear market in 2019.

 

Emerging Markets: Relief Not Reprieve

A sharp drop in oil prices, a pause in the US dollar rally, signs of increasing fiscal stimulus in China and retreating long-term Treasury yields are providing emerging markets much needed relief. While the structural challenges, particularly on the funding side, faced by many of the emerging economies are unlikely to be resolved soon, the welcome liquidity relief can certainly provide tradable opportunities for investors.

Moreover, as we noted in December, emerging markets have been outperforming US markets since early October, which may well provide further impetus for asset allocators to re-consider exposures and potentially exchange some of their US exposure in favour of emerging markets.

Ratio of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index to the S&P 500 IndexEMSPXSources: Bloomberg

The simple play is to be long the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF $EEM. And in times of either euphoria or despair, it can prove to be the right choice as there can often be little to distinguish between constituent level returns. Nonetheless, with the rise of China’s tech giant, we think $EEM has become both too tech and too top heavy.

For broad-based exposure we prefer being long dedicated emerging market asset manager Ashmore Group $ASHM.LN. In terms of country selection we prefer being long Russia $ERUS and Indonesia $EIDO. We would also like to be long Hungary, opportunities for direct exposure to the country are, however, limited and is instead better played with some exposure to Austria $EWO.

  

Semiconductors: Led On the Way Down, To Lead On the Way Up?

 We were bearish on the prospects of semiconductor stocks for the better part of 2018. With technology at the centre of China’s trade conflict with the US, and no technology more critical than semiconductors, our thinking was that production capacities, led by China, would rise faster than the market was pricing in.

While China has made headway in gaining market share in the more commoditised segments of the semiconductor market, it has failed to catch up with the leading chip companies in the world. The top-end of the semiconductors market remains tightly controlled by a handful of players.

The Trump Administration’s security hawks and a slowing China, however, have, we think, had a far greater impact on the sharp drop in chip prices than the increases in production capacities.

With valuations for the constituents of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Semiconductor Index $SOX having corrected significantly and a lot of doom-and-gloom reflected after Apple’s guidance cut, we think semiconductors are well-placed to surprise to the upside in 2019.

  

Philadelphia Stock Exchange Semiconductor Index Trailing 12 Month P/E RatioSOXPESource: Bloomberg

Moreover, if there is to be a favourable outcome to the trade related negotiations between the US and China, we suspect China will pony up to reduce its trade surplus with the US by offering to buy more chips.

 

Saudi Arabia: Emerging Market Indices Inclusion

Ignoring the human rights grievances, the fallout from the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, and the sharp drop in the price of oil, we weigh the opportunity of investing in Saudi Arabia based purely on a technicality. That technicality being the inclusion of Saudi Arabia into the FTSE and MSCI emerging market indices in 2019.

Based on broker estimates, passively managed assets of greater than US dollars 15 billion are expected to flow into the Saudi equity market on the back of the inclusions. The vast majority of these passive flows are set to materialise during the first half of 2019. Given the size of flows relative to average daily traded values of less than US dollars 1 billion, the passive flows can move the needle in a market with few other positive catalysts.

We remain long the iShares MSCI Saudi Arabia ETF $KSA.

Outsiders for Outsized Returns

 

Here we discuss investment ideas that we think have an outside chance of generating outsized returns during 2019. We see these opportunities as cheaply priced out-of-the-money call options that may warrant a small allocation for those with a more opportunistic disposition.

Triunfo Albicelestes

Argentina, to put it mildly, has a chequered history when it comes to repaying its creditors. It has defaulted on its external debt at least seven times and domestic debt five times in the 202 years since its independence.

Argentina first defaulted on its sovereign debt in 1827, only eleven years after gaining independence from Spain. It took three decades to resume payments on the defaulted bonds.

The Baring Crisis, the most famous of the sovereign debt crises of the nineteenth century, originated in Argentina – at a time when Argentina was a rich nation and its credibility as a borrower had been restored. Argentina had borrowed heavily during the boom years of the 1880s and Britain was the dominant source of those funds. The flow of funds from Britain was so great that when Argentina defaulted on its obligations in 1890, the then world’s largest merchant bank, Baring Brothers & Co., almost went bankrupt. Had it not been for intervention by the Bank of England, the British lender would have been long gone before Nick Leeson came along a century later.

In 1982, Argentina once again failed to honour its external debt obligations and remained in default for almost a decade. Its emergence from default was made possible by the creation of Brady bonds – a solution proposed by then US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady as a means for debt-reduction by developing nations.

In the 1990’s Argentina kept piling on debt until it finally defaulted on around US dollars 80 billion of obligations in 2001, which at the time was the largest sovereign default ever. The government managed to restructure 93 per cent of the defaulted debt by 2010; however, Paul Singer’s Elliot Management famously held out and kept Argentina exiled from international debt markets for a further six years. Argentina returned to the bond market in 2016 after settling with the hedge fund and bringing to an end a long-running saga, which saw Paul Singer take extreme measures such as convincing Ghanaian courts to seize an Argentinian navy vessel so it could collects on its debt.

The lessons from Argentina’s history of defaults, however, were quickly unlearned by capital markets. In little more than a year after its return to the bond markets, Argentina successfully pulled-off the sale of a 100-year bond in 2017. The good times did not last very long, however. In August 2018, Argentina was heading to the IMF cap-in-hand requesting the early release of a US dollars 50 billion loan. By end of September the IMF had increased the debt-package to US dollars 57.1 billion – making it the biggest bailout package ever offered by the IMF.

After running through Argentina’s history of debt defaults and at a time when it may appear that its future is bleak, we are here to tell you that Argentina has the foundations in place to surprise to the upside.

The days of “Kirchnerismo”, the legacy of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s and her late husband Néstor’s  twelve years in power, defined by the concentration of power, unsustainable welfare programmes and fiscal profligacy shrouded under the guise of nationalism, are gone. President Mauricio Macri’s willingness to chart a new course, armed with a robust IMF bailout package, we think, can help revive the Argentinian economy.

What is transpiring in neighbouring Brazil, too, has potential spill over effects on Argentina. If newly elected president Mr Jair Bolsonaro remains true to his word, Brazil is likely to pursue a reformist economic agenda that liberalises the economy from the statist policies that were the mainstay of the Workers’ Party’s rule. If the economic reforms spur growth in Brazil, Argentina should benefit – Brazil is, after all, Argentina’s largest trading partner.

President Bolsonaro’s external agenda is also likely to diverge from that of his predecessors. He has openly criticised China – Brazil’s largest trading partner – and expressed a desire to forge closer ties with the US. If Brazil pivots towards the US, Argentina, as South America’s second largest economy, is likely to be wooed aggressively by China. China’s ambition to dilute the US’s influence in Latina America is an open secret. In China’s bid to acquire influence, Argentina is well placed to attract investments from Beijing.

There are many ways to play this theme be it through the bond market, the currency or the equity market. For the average equity market investor the easiest way to gain exposure is probably through the Global X MSCI Argentina ETF $ ARGT.

Data Driven Dystopia: “The monetization of every move you make

From The New Yorker’s article “How the Artificial-Intelligence Program AlphaZero Mastered Its Games”:

“David Silver, the head of research at DeepMind, has pointed out a seeming paradox at the heart of his company’s recent work with games: the simpler its programs got—from AlphaGo to AlphaGo Zero to AlphaZero—the better they performed. “Maybe one of the principles that we’re after,” he said, in a talk in December of 2017, “is this idea that by doing less, by removing complexity from the algorithm, it enables us to become more general.” By removing the Go knowledge from their Go engine, they made a better Go engine—and, at the same time, an engine that could play shogi and chess.”

As the leading tech companies have ramped up investments in developing their artificial intelligence – or machine learning, if you prefer – capabilities, what has started to become apparent is that data not algorithms hold the keys to success. The companies that collect the most and best data, not the ones that develop the most sophisticated algorithms, are likely to reap the greatest rewards from investing in artificial intelligence.

One, much maligned, ‘wearables’ company that has been tracking and collecting data on its users’ movements for many years, with little to show for it, is Fitbit Inc. $FIT. The company has fallen out of favour amongst investors ever since the launch of the Apple Watch – particularly after Apple’s health and fitness pivot following the launch of Series 2.

We think $FIT is a viable acquisition target for Amazon.

Amazon, through the Echo, is already collecting data at home and could close the data loop with an acquisition of $FIT. $FIT’s wrist bands and watches can be integrated with Alexa and with a little investment be upgraded to better compete with the Apple Watch. Moreover, Amazon could feature $FIT’s products front and centre on the most valuable retail real estate in the world – Amazon’s homepage.

 

Books

Five We Have Read and Recommend

  1. Monetary Regimes and Inflation: History, Economics and Political Relationships by Peter Bernholz
  2. Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent by Edward Luce
  3. Thinking in Bets: Making Smarter Decisions When You Don’t Have All the Facts by Annie Duke
  4. The Art of Execution: How the world’s best investors get it wrong and still make millions by Lee Freeman-Shor
  5. Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought by Andrew W. Lo

Five from Our 2019 Reading List

  1. Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World by Adam Tooze
  2. The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse by Michael Pettis
  3. Efficiently Inefficient: How Smart Money Invests and Market Prices Are Determined by Lasse Heje Pedersen
  4. The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement by Eliyahu M. Goldratt and Jeff Cox
  5. These Truths: A History of the United States by Jill Lepore

 

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This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. 

China Shadow Banking | US Foreign Funding

“[H]ope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who are risking their all on one cast find out what it means only when they are already ruined.” – Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War

“Narrative is linear, but action has breadth and depth as well as height and is solid.” – Thomas Carlyle

Continuing on from last week,  we share more market observations that have caught our attention as we think about investment ideas and themes for 2019. This piece, too, will be chart heavy.

Please note this will be this year’s last weekly update, we will be back with our next piece during the first week of January.

China Shadow Banking

China’s leadership, at the end of last year, made it abundantly clear that ­reining in financial risk was an economic priority for the next three years. With the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2021, Chinese leadership would be loathe to witness the run up to the milestone be marred by an economic collapse precipitated by spiralling debt.

About the CCP it is sometimes said “to watch what they do and not what they say”. At least in this instance, they have done exactly as they said they would.

Chinese shadow finance has collapsed and there are no signs of reprieve – the drop in shadow finance has not been cushioned by stimulative fiscal policies undertaken by the central government. Monetary policy, too, has remained neutral for much of the year. It is only in recent months that we have seen some loosening of monetary policy at the margin with the reduction in reserve requirements for banks.

According to Reuters, by the end of September, 25 Chinese issuers had defaulted on
payments for 52 bonds worth a total of 60.6 billion yuan.  Compared with 20 issuers defaulting on 44 bonds worth 38.5 billion yuan during 2017, and 35 issuers defaulting on 79 bonds worth 39.9 billion yuan in 2016.

China Shadow Banking

The Chinese leadership’s resolve in sticking to its financial de-risking policy is being tested by both the Trump Administration’s hawkish trade policies and, what we suspect is, a much sharper slow down in credit growth and economic activity than anticipated.  Despite the economic challenges, we do not think the CCP will relent – at least not when it comes to shadow banking. Too much effort has already gone into scaling back shadow finance and slowly ridding the system of bad actors.

Emerging Markets

The fortunes of emerging markets are closely intertwined with those of China – the Mainland is, of course, the leading trade partner of the majority of emerging markets. With the collapse of shadow financing  and economic slowdown in China, we have seen emerging markets fall quickly out of favour amongst investors.  At the end of November, the MSCI Emerging Market Index was down 12.2 per cent for the year.

MXEF Index (MSCI Emerging Market 2018-12-14 14-08-40.jpg

In last week’s piece we highlighted that we are seeing initial signs that emerging markets may well have formed an interim bottom in October and are well placed to outperform US markets in 2019.

How do we then reconcile our expectation of emerging market out performance in 2019 with the continuation of financial de-risking in China?

Consider the following chart, which plots the 12 month moving average of year-over-year Chinese social financing growth with the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) Spot Raw Industrial Commodities Index.  The three instances since 2007 when Chinese social financing growth has bottomed and accelerated have each been preceded by a bottoming of the CRB Index.

China Social Financing Industrial Commodities

The CRB Index peaked in January and witnessed a sharp drop from May on-wards. Recently, however, the index has started to rise again. While it is early days still, the rising CRB Index may be indicative of China once again beginning to stimulate its economy.

Instead of social financing picking up, however, we may have to look for confirmation elsewhere.

In August, China’s Ministry of Finance said local governments should complete no less than 80 percent of their special bond issuance quota by end of September.  Local governments in China issue special bonds for such purposes as highway projects and shanty town redevelopment.  Local governments were set a quota of 1.35 trillion yuan of special bonds issuance this year. During the first half of the year, however, local governments had utilised less than 25 per cent of their quotas.

We will be monitoring infrastructure investment growth and local government bond issuance closely to anticipate a recovery in Chinese economic activity and by extension to time an entry into emerging markets.

China Infrastructure Investment YoY

Infrastructure investment and local bond issuance aside, the Chinese economy has received some much needed relief from the recent drops in oil and semiconductor prices. In 2017, China spent US dollars 260 billion semiconductors imports, according to the China Semiconductor Industry Association. In comparison, China spent US dollars 162 billion on importing oil.

ISPPDR37 Index (inSpectrum Tech  2018-12-14 18-59-38.jpg

US Foreign Funding and US Dollar Implications

In “Is the United States Relying on Foreign Investors to Fund Its Larger Budget Deficit?“, a piece issued on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Liberty Street Economics blog, the authors write (emphasis added):

“Data for the first half of 2018 are available and, so far, the country has not had to increase the pace of borrowing from abroad. The current account balance, which measures how much the United States borrows from the rest of the world, has been essentially unchanged. Instead, the tax cut has boosted private saving, allowing the United States to finance the higher federal government deficit without increasing the amount borrowed from foreign investors.”

Just because the US has been able to rely on higher private savings to fund its deficit this year does not mean it will be able to continue to fund deficits without increased foreign participation. The authors speculate:

Of course, these are early days and it will be interesting to see how the increase in business saving will play out. For example, the increase in that saving component may diminish over time, perhaps because firms pass on some of their profit boost from lower taxes to their customers via a drop in markups. Firms could also use their higher after-tax income for salary increases in the current tight labor market. A third possibility is for firms use the jump in saving to increase their capital stock through higher investment spending. Indeed, this perspective suggests that a deterioration in the trade balance is a sign that firms are passing on the gains from the tax cut to their employees and consumers.

Finally, the additional downward pressure on government saving going forward will be from higher spending. It may turn out that future drops in government saving from higher spending translate more directly into higher borrowing from abroad.

As we have argued in the past, a rising US dollar environment and add to it a shortage of US dollar funding for non-US borrowers, which increases borrowing and hedging costs, are not the conditions under which foreign institutional investors increase their participation in US Treasury instruments. We  are already witnessing Japanese institutional investors scaling back their exposure to US Treasury instruments.

The below chart shows the cumulative Japanese portfolio flows into the US:

Japan Cumulative Portfolio Flows US.jpg

The US’s current account balance has been unchanged despite Japanese outflows because of higher oil prices. Middle Eastern oil exporters have recycled their petrodollars back into US Treasury instruments as oil prices have exceeded their fiscal break-even levels this year. With oil prices having corrected recently, however, Middle Eastern participation is likely to diminish.

If, indeed, the US ends up requiring foreign participation to increase to fund its deficits we expect one or both of the following to happens:

1. The US Treasury will start spending from its General Account – much like it did in late 2016 / early 2017 in anticipation of a potential government shutdown – and this will release much needed US dollar liquidity into the global banking system.

2. The Fed starts offering foreign central banks unlimited (or very high) quantities for US dollar swap lines much like it did in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The Fed has the ability to fix the quantity of US dollars available, this results in the price of US dollars rising when demand for US dollars rises, or fix the price of US dollars, this results in unlimited availability of US dollars. Today the Fed fixes the quantity of US dollars available not the price.

Both of the above would be US dollar negative and would provide a signal to short $DXY / go long emerging market currencies.

TGA DXY

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.