Osaka: From Trade to Tech

 

“Decisions in a modern state tend to be made by the interaction, not of Congress and the executive, but of public opinion and the executive.” ―Walter Lippman, The Basic Problem of Democracy, 1919

 

 

Before going on to this week’s commentary, we wanted to share a passage from These Truths: A History of the United States by Jill Lepore:

 

Progressivism had roots in late nineteenth-century populism; Progressivism was the middle-class version: indoors, quiet, passionless. Populists raised hell; Progressives read pamphlets. Populists had argued that the federal government’s complicity in the consolidation of power in the hands of big banks, big railroads, and big businesses had betrayed both the nation’s founding principles and the will of the people, and that the government itself was riddled with corruption. “The People’s Party in the protest of the plundered against the plunderers―of the victim against the robbers,” said one organizer at the founding of the People’s Party in 1892. “A vast conspiracy against mankind has been organized on two continents and is rapidly taking possession of the world,” said another. Progressives championed the same causes as Populists, and took their side in railing against big business, but while Populists generally wanted less government, Progressives wanted more, seeking solutions in reform legislation and in the establishment of bureaucracies, especially government agencies.

 

Populists believed that the system was broken; Progressives believed that the government could fix it. Conservatives who happened to dominate the Supreme Court, didn’t believe that there was anything to fix but believed that, if there was, the market would fix it. Notwithstanding conservatives’ influence in the judiciary, Progressivism spanned both parties.

 

The United States of America has been here before.

 

We will be sharing passages from Jill Lepore’s magnum opus over the coming weeks and months in the run up to the Democratic primary battle for 2020 Presidential Election.

 

Osaka: From Trade to Tech

 

From The Wall Street Journal:

 

Some money managers are bracing for a potential resurgence in trade tensions after President Trump’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this weekend by hedging their bets with currencies and options.

Strategies include a short on the Australian dollar and other currencies as well as bearish put options on the iShares China Large-Cap exchange-traded fund. Money managers including Russell Investments have pared their exposure to U.S. stocks, favoring more-attractively-valued shares of emerging-market companies.

How those moves pan out largely depends on what happens in Osaka, Japan, this weekend, when Messrs. Trump and Xi meet Saturday on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit. There is no clear consensus among investors on whether the U.S. and China can reach a deal. Trade-policy uncertainty remains at elevated levels, according to data compiled by Wells Fargo Investment Institute.

Rather than being left flat-footed, investors are taking precautions in case talks lead to an impasse or, worse, a full-blown escalation in tensions. The S&P 500 slumped 6.6% in May following the unexpected implementation of additional tariffs on China’s products.

 

With one trading day remaining before President Trump and President Xi are expected to meet at the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, the S&P 500 Index is down 69 basis points while the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Semiconductor Index is up 317 basis points. Huawei is likely to be part of any potential trade deal, the recent strength in semiconductors could well reflect some optimism for trade negotiations taking a turn for the better following the meeting between Messrs. Trump and Xi.

 

While we are somewhat optimistic with progress being made on trade negotiations, more on that anon, we are concerned the economic hostilities between the US and China gradually shifting from being centered around trade to being increasingly focused on enabling technologies, such as semiconductors, and core technology infrastructure, such as telecommunication  networks. For that reason, we would use any trade optimism related rallies in semiconductor stocks to further reduce exposure or add short positions.

 

Trade Optimism

 

The noise out of Washington suggests that there is a more than even chance that the talks between the leaders of the largest economies in the world will result in a deal in the next few months. It may well also be that the US and China negotiate a truce on Huawei, although any deal relating to the Chinese telecommunication changed could be torpedoes by Congress.

 

Our view is predicated on President Trump, not the trade hawks in his administration, wanting a deal rather than applying further tariffs on US dollar 325 billion of Chinese imports that he threatened to impose as early as next month.

 

We expect the two leaders to announce, following their meeting, that trade talks will resume and they expect a deal to be hammered out before the end of the year. The hawks on the Chinese side are likely to agitate for all tariffs to be eliminated with immediate effect. While the hawks in the Trump Administration will continue to insist that China enshrine its commitments in law.

 

Beijing has already made changes to its laws by passing a new Foreign Investment Law in March, and making amendments to its intellectual property-related laws and regulations. Changes to the intellectual property laws and regulations offer, accord to experts we have spoken to, significantly stronger protection for foreign intellectual property rights and limit Chinese corporations ability to coerce technology transfer.  More action is likely to be required China, but at least there appears to be meaningful progress on this front.

 

Putting China’s Technological Progress in Check

 

Among the preconditions for a trade agreement put forth by China is the requirement for the US to remove its ban on the sale of US technology Huawei. This will be a tricky matter to resolve. The Trump Administration has for months been drumming up anti-Huawei sentiment in Washington that any attempt to compromise will be seen as selling out national security for monetary gains. Senator Mitt Romney is already working on legislation that would prevent the President from removing Huawei from the export ban list.

 

Of the few bipartisan issues in Washington is the desire to put China’s technological progress in check, particularly its development of semiconductor and defense industries. Therefore, in our opinion, any trade deal is likely to skirt around the Huawei and technology transfer issues. These issues are then likely to manifest through alternative channels after a trade deal has been struck. One possibility is for a compromise allowing Huawei to resume buying components from US suppliers, in exchange for some restrictions on Huawei building out telecommunication networks US-friendly jurisdictions.

 

The technology-led US equity bull market might not die of old age but may die because the power players in Washington decide that the no amount of lost revenue is worth salvaging in its bid to slow the rise of China.

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trade Wars Revisited – Part II

 

“The secret to gaining the upper hand in a negotiation is to give the other side the illusion of control.” Christopher Voss, former FBI hostage negotiator

Idea Updates

 

In our 2019 outlook piece issued on 7 January, we highlighted a number of emerging market ideas, the following are the idea we recommend closing out now:

 

1. Global X MSCI Argentina ETF $ARGT, which is up 11.61 per cent from market close on 7 January till yesterday’s close.

2. Ashmore Group $ASHM.LN, which is up 26.02 per cent from market close on 7 January till yesterday’s close in US dollar terms.

3. iShares MSCI Indonesia ETF $EIDO, which is down 9.66 per cent from market close on 7 January till yesterday’s close.

 

During the same period as the above ideas were open, the S&P 500 and MSCI ACWI indices have generated total returns of 11.56 and 9.07 per cent, respectively.

 

Trade Wars Revisited

 

More Bad News for Huawei

 

From the Financial Times:

 

Arm, which provides the underlying chip designs for the world’s smartphones as well as for many other types of semiconductors, has suspended business with the Chinese telecoms company due to the US clampdown on supplying it.

 

From the Nikkei Asian Review:

 

German chipmaker Infineon Technologies has suspended certain shipments to Huawei Technologies, three people familiar with the matter told the Nikkei Asian Review, in the first sign that Washington’s crackdown on the Chinese tech giant is beginning to choke off vital chip supplies from non-U. S. companies.

 

Huawei is going to need a lifeline sooner rather than later and the only person capable of providing it is President Trump. The Chinese company is likely to be central to an trade negotiations henceforth.

 

Is Oil Also Hostage to the Trade Dispute?

 

China’s three weaknesses just so happen to be three of the US’s strengths. One being semiconductors, which we have discussed previously, and the other two being oil and the US dollar.

 

China imports a lot of oil and produces very little of it. The US, propelled by the near miracle that is the Permian Basin, has become a net exporter of oil. A rising oil price hurts China, while it benefits the US and vice versa.

 

Given these dynamics, one is left considering the possibility that the US imposing economic sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, two oil exporting nations, and strong hints of warmongering in the Middle East by the Secretary of State Michael Pompeo  is as much about Iran and Venezuela as it is about weaponizing oil against China.

 

If the US is indeed weaponizing oil then it is only a matter time before a controversy or conflict involving the Strait of Malacca hits the newswires. More than 90 percent of crude oil volumes flowing through the South China Sea transit through the Strait of Malacca, the shortest sea route between suppliers in Africa and the Persian Gulf and markets in Asia, making it one of the world’s primary oil transit chokepoints according to the US Energy Information Administration.

 

On the other hand, much like Huawei was stockpiling semiconductor inventories in case of an escalation in the US-China trade dispute, China, too, may have been stockpiling oil ahead of a possible escalation in the trade war. If indeed this has been the case, then some of the strength in the price of oil, particularly relative to other commodities, can be explained by the aggressive buying by China.

 

The top panel in the below chart are the monthly volumes of oil imported by China. The bottom panel is the year-over-year change in oil imports.

 

CCCIIQTL Index (China Customs Cr 2019-05-24 14-46-13.jpg

 

In the second panel in the chart above, we can see that the year-over-year increase in Chinese oil imports was the highest in December since May 2016. What explanation could there be for the aggressive Chinese buying other than stockpiling ahead of a potential escalation in the trade dispute? The price was certainly was not as attractive as it was in 2016 and the Chinese economy was not as strong as it was then either.

 

The Chinese response to a weaponizing of oil, we think, can come in three forms:

 

1. Scaling back of monthly imports in response to the tighter oil markets and higher price.

2. Finding a work around the sanctions on Venezuela and Iran and buying oil from them in return for renminbi or gold.

3. Urging Russia, its supposed ally and victim of US imposed sanctions, to break rank from OPEC and bring to an end the self-imposed production quotas in a bid to capture higher share of Chinese demand.

 

We think we have entered a volatile phase for the price of oil driven by the waxing and waning of push and pull forces in the trade dispute.

 

A More Coherent Trade Strategy by the Trump Administration

 

In May of last year in AIG, Robert E. Lighthizer, Made in China 2025, and the Semiconductors Bull Market we wrote (emphasis added):

 

Mr Lighthizer’s primary objectives with respect to US-Sino trade relations are (1) for China to open up its economy – by removing tariffs and ownership limits – for the benefit of Corporate America and (2) to put an end to Chinese practices that erode the competitive advantages enjoyed by US corporations – practices such as forcing technology transfer as a condition for market access.

 

Mr Lighthizer’s goals are ambitious. They will require time and patience from everyone – including President Trump, Chinese officials, US allies, and investors. For that, he will need to focus Mr Trump’s attention on China. He will not want the President continuing his thus far ad hoc approach to US trade policy. If NAFTA and other trade deals under negotiations with allies such as South Korea are dealt with swiftly, we would take that as a clear signal that Mr Lighthizer is in control of driving US trade policy.

 

China is clearly becoming the administrations’ singular focus when it comes to trade.  Other trade disputes are being diffused just as hostilities towards China are escalating.

 

Last Friday it was announced that an agreement had been reached to lift the tariffs imposed by the US against Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminium imports in no later than two days.  The tariffs, implemented last year by the Trump Administration had been a key impediment to Congressional ratification of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and made chances of passage of the agreement this year difficult.

 

In addition to lifting the import tariffs against Canada and Mexico, President Trump also has delayed for six months a decision on imposing tariffs on automobile and auto parts imports.

 

While the amendments to the USMCA and the postponements to the auto tariffs are positives within a sea of negativity (at least as it relates to capital markets), we do not consider the risk of auto tariffs being imposed to have diminished. Rather we see the postponement as a sign that President Trump will return to the matter with renewed intensity.

 

President Trump, since taking office, has barely wavered is his commitment to protectionism. In 2016 he campaigned on a protectionist agenda that he will want to claim he has  delivered upon in his 2020 re-election bid. Moreover, with think he will feel is odds for success will be further strengthened by taking a hard line approach on trade rather than by negotiating agreements that would leave him open to criticism by both the trade hawks in his administration and by Democrats in Congress. Therefore we do not expect the President to pass up on the opportunity to be seen as being tough not only on China but also Japan and Germany, the nations most vulnerable to auto tariffs.

 

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

 

 

 

 

 

Trade Wars Revisited – Part I

 

“Uncertainty always creates doubt, and doubt creates fear.” — Oscar Munoz, Chief Executive Officer of United Airlines

“When the uncertain future becomes the past, the past in turn becomes uncertain.” from Moth Smoke by Mohsin Hamid

 

We revisit the trade dispute between the US and China this week. We apologise in advance for the lengthy quotes from pieces we wrote last year but felt it necessary to provide context.

 

Note: We have split this week’s commentary in two parts as it runs quite long, the first part is below and the second will follow by Friday this week.

 

 

In December of last year in The Hawks Have Not Left the Building we wrote (emphasis added):

 

[W]e do not expect a breakthrough in negotiations to materialise during the next round of talks between Washington and Beijing before the suspension of the increase in tariffs lapses. As long as hawks such as Peter Navarro and Robert E. Lighthizer continue to have President Trump’s ear our view is unlikely to change. If, however, the dovish members of the Trump Administration, such as Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin and Director of the National Economic Council Lawrence Kudlow, begin to take control of proceedings we would become much more hopeful of a positive resolution to the trade dispute.

 

For now, we see the temporary agreement between the two sides as providing much needed short-term respite for China. More importantly, we see President Trump’s offer of a temporary ceasefire without President Xi offering any concessions on sensitive issues, such as industrial policy, state funded subsidies and intellectual property rights, to be a symptom of the short-termism that seemingly besets democratically elected leaders without exception. Had the US equity capital markets not faltered recently and / or the Republicans not lost control of the House of Representatives, it is unlikely, we think, that President Trump would have been as acquiescent.

 

The above quote provides the frame of reference from which the remainder of the analysis in this piece stems from.

 

Semiconductors: From Bad to Worse

 

The below chart compares the performance of the S&P 500 Index to that of the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index $SOX and the ADR of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company $TSM over the course of the last month.

 

SPX Index (S&P 500 Index) Multi  2019-05-21 12-36-54.png

 

President Trump first tweeted about the trade negotiations with China falling apart on 5 May. Markets sold off a little in response to the tweet, semiconductor stocks sold off more. Then things got worse for semiconductor stocks, the US government issued an edict banning American suppliers from doing business with one of their biggest customers, Huawei Technologies Company, without the explicit approval of the US government. And then got even worse, the South China Morning reported that Huawei allegedly has been stockpiling a year’s worth of inventory out of fear of export ban being placed on US manufacturers. If true, US chipmakers’ earnings last year were much inflated.

 

Following the negative news, and striking a fear into markets that the Trump Administration was willing and able to inflict direct harm on US corporations in its bids to rein in China, government officials have come out suggesting that a handful of temporary exemptions may be granted. This would give some suppliers and customers of China’s telecom giant a 90-day reprieve from tough trade penalties.

 

From Fragile to “Antifragile”…

 

On 6 June 1967, Arab oil producing nations, to deter nations from supporting Israel in the six-day war, placed an embargo on oil exports to the US, UK and a number of other western nations. At the time the embargo was imposed, the UK was wholly dependent on foreign on oil resources and was, unsurprisingly, severely impacted by the embargo.

 

Between 1969 and 1970, vast oil reserves were discovered by the UK under the North Sea.

 

Then again in 1973, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries proclaimed an oil embargo targeting the US, Canada, the UK, Netherlands, Japan and South Africa. The embargo was targeted at nations perceived as supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The price of oil shot up from US dollars 3 per barrel to nearly US dollars 12 globally.

 

In 1973, the UK was still a net importer of oil and felt the sting from the Arab oil boycott. By 1979, on the back of the strength of the North Sea discovery,  UK had propelled itself to become a net exporter of oil.

 

Just as the Arab oil embargoes spurred the UK’s discovery of North Sea Oil and eventual energy independence, the actions of the Trump Administration are almost certainly going to harden China’s resolve in developing a captive semiconductor industry.

 

President Xi Jinping has during his reign recounted the long and painful history of China surrendering to British imperialists in the nineteenth century, often referred to as the “century of humiliation”. Neither he nor his comrades at the Chinese Communist Party will want China’s dependence on US chipmakers to become a source of humiliation or an impediment to its growth ambitions. China has no choice but to invest in developing a captive semiconductor industry capable of competing with the best and brightest.

 

But Achieving Antafragility Takes Time

 

From the original Arabian oil embargo, it took the UK a further eleven years to build up its oil production capabilities and to free itself from any future oil exporter hostilities.

 

China, too, will need time to develop its captive semiconductor industry. Huawei’s alleged hoarding of a year’s worth of supply of American manufactured inventory proves as much.

 

China’s semiconductor industry remains far behind its American and Korean counterparts in the manufacture of advanced processing chips. The challenges is further compounded with non-existent local production of the equipment that is required to design and fabricate advanced processing chips.

 

Semiconductor companies are now hostage to the vagaries of the American and Chinese trade dispute. Should some semblance of a trade agreement be miraculously salvaged semiconductor stocks will most likely rally and rally hard. If not, they might be in a long, painful ride.

 

The Huawei Question

 

Huawei, not for first time, is suffering at the hands of the US political establishment.

 

In January 2018, AT&T, pressured by Washington, walked away from a deal to sell the Huawei smartphone, the Mate 10, to customers in the United States just before the partnership was set to be unveiled. Verizon shortly followed suit.

 

Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei and daughter of the company’s founder, was arrested on 1 December 2018 in Canada at the request of the US government for allegedly defrauding multiple financial institutions in breach of US-imposed bans on dealing with Iran.

 

In February 2019, US officials lobbied European authorities in banning Huawei from 5G network builds in Europe and called the Chinese company “duplicitous and deceitful”.

 

By forbidding US companies from trading with Huawei, one of China’s most prominent technology companies, without the government’s explicit permission, the Trump Administration is clearly sending a message. And the ban is not just limited to US companies, export controls also extend to non-US companies that sell any product in which US-origin technology comprises 25 per cent or more of the value. Given in the intertwined nature of semiconductor production, implying that Huawei is likely unable to replace US products it loses access to.

 

The question now is whether the Trump Administration goes for the kill or not. ZTE had to cease operations after being hit with US export controls, Huawei is likely to suffer same fate unless US officials make a u-turn. Given the heavy criticism President Trump received for rolling back sanctions on ZTE, it is unlikely that he would be as forgiving this time around with US elections next year unless he wants to revive the trade deal.

 

The fate of Huawei is now likely to signal the outcome of the trade deal:

 

1. Huawei survives and retains most of its pre-export glory and we get a “beautiful” trade deal.

2. Huawei survives but in a scaled back form and we get a patched up trade deal with both sides saving face.

3. Huawei fails and the trade deal is dead, or at least takes a very long-time to revive.

 

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Will Europe be the Fall Guy in the Trade Deal?

 

“Capable, generous men do not create victims, they nurture victims.”  — Julian Assange

 

“Politics is tricky; it cuts both ways. Every time you make a choice, it has unintended consequences.”  — Stone Gossard, lead guitarist for Pearl Jam and member of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame

 

A slightly shorter piece than usual this week as we recover from  jet lag following a ten day trip to the US. This week we discuss, the potential fallout from a US-China trade deal.

 

 

In 1978 China accounted for less than one hundredth of global trade. By the turn of the millennium, its share had increased threefold. In a decade’s time, by 2010, its share of global trade had tripled again and in 2013 China surpassed the United States, becoming the world’s largest overall trading nation.

 

As China’s share of global trade has increased so too has the number of trade disputes it has been involved in. Between 2006 and 2015, China was party to, as either complainant or respondent, in more than a quarter of the trade dispute cases lodged with the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

 

Notably, according to Harvard Law Professor Mark Wu, there has been a notable shift in the “pattern of WTO cases among the major trading economies — the United States, European Union, Japan, and China”. Up until the global financial crisis, the US, Japan and the European Union would regularly file complaints against one another. Following the crisis, however, only three cases have been brought by the three major developed economies against one another. Instead, the cases brought by the major powers have almost exclusively been focused on China — 90 per cent of the cases they brought to the WTO between 2009 and 2015 were China-related.

 

The meteoric rise of the Chinese economy and its growing influence on global trade has challenged the pretext under which the WTO was formed. The WTO has struggled to adapt and to develop an equitable dispute settlement system to counter China’s, at times, egregious trade practices. The WTO cannot, given China’s importance to global trade, make rulings or draft new rules that China sees as discriminatory or unfair but at the same time it cannot seen to be a lame duck and see other member countries turn away from it. The inability to effectively settle this dilemma has weakened the institution’s credibility.  So much so that the WTO Appellate Body no longer has enough members to hear all possible cases — the US has vetoed all appointments to the body. Many see the US vetoes as a death knell for the WTO — signalling a return to  a world where trade disputes are settled through bilateral negotiations and the WTO’s dispute settlement system is defunct.

 

The United States Trade Representative, Robert E. Lighthizer, has, since taking office in May 2017, pursued a campaign against China based on the statutes of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which allows unilateral action by the US President against trade policies deemed unfair. In effect, the US Trade Representative’s strategy sidelines the WTO.

 

The Trump Administration’s approach of using Section 301 has been seen, by many, as both aggressive and likely to lead to negative consequences for the Chinese economy.  What if, however, President Trump has come to the realisation, that also afflicted his predecessors, that the American and Chinese economies are too closely intertwined for either side to be a victor in a trade war? If so, we wonder, is Europe going to be the fall guy in the trade deal?

 

Europe’s Trade Surplus with the US

 

From the Wall Street Journal:

 

The European Union reported a record trade surplus with the U.S. last year, a development that could weigh on slow-moving U.S.-EU trade talks and comes as the Trump administration prepares to deliberate hefty tariffs on European car imports.

Meanwhile, slowing exports from Europe to other trading partners, most notably China, in 2018 suggest the flagging EU economy could cool further this year. Failure of the U.S.-EU trade talks and fresh duties from the U.S. could compound Europe’s economic pain in 2019.

 

President Trump, we suspect, is going to look for an alternative win should the trade dispute with China be resolved amicably. We suspect, Europe, with its record bilateral trade surplus, is likely to find itself in the line of fire. For it was only days before Trump’s visit to Europe last year that President Macron called for the creation of a “true European army” and agitating the US President in the process.  Moreover, Europe is in a mess —  with the small matter of Britain’s exit from Europe imminent and a leadership vacuum with Angela Merkel a lame duck in office, Emmanuel Macron too occupied trying to contain the yellow vest movement, Italy moving from one crisis to another — meaning there is little hope for a coordinated response from the trade bloc, should President Trump throw down the gauntlet.

 

With any resolution of the US-China trade dispute likely to come with conditions for China to increase purchases of US goods and services, China is likely to reduce purchases of European goods and services in response. This is will only compound Europe’s problem further.

 

We think there is little reason to be overweight, or even equal weight, European equities at present.

 

Extending the same line of thinking, we think China is likely to increase its purchases of agricultural commodities from the US by reducing purchases from Brazil. For emerging markets exposure, we would underweight Brazil.

 

Semiconductor Leadership

 

 

Were the above tweets a wink to the national security hawks in the Trump Administration to end the pursuit of Huawei and stop placing export controls on US semiconductors producers?

 

If so, we think $SOXX should continue to be amongst the leaders in the US market. If, however, if there is sudden weakness in the semiconductor space we would be concerned about the prospects of an amicable trade resolution.

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

 

 

 

 

Trade Wars: Portfolio Hedges | 3-D Printing

“It’s easier to hold your principles 100 percent of the time than it is to hold them 98 percent of the time.”  — Clayton M. Christensen

“Character, like a photograph, develops in darkness.”  — Yousuf Karsh

In this week’s piece we discuss hedges to provide some portfolio protection under the different potential outcomes to the US-China trade dispute as the 1 March deadline to  reach an agreement approaches. Also this week, we discuss 3-D printing — the one time darling and now much maligned corner of the technology sector — and consider potential long ideas within the segment.

Trade Wars: Portfolio Hedges

US trade representative, Robert E. Lighthizer, and US Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin,  are heading to Beijing this week, ahead of the 1 March deadline to reach an agreement and prevent a further hike in tariffs.  As part of the on going negotiations, the Trump Administration is demanding China to (1) reduce its trade surplus with the US, (2) stop enabling the theft or forced transfer of intellectual property and trade secrets from US businesses operating in China, (3) ease restrictions on foreign investment and foreign ownership of Chinese companies, and (4) put an end to industrial subsidies and the preferential treatment given by the Chinese government to state-owned enterprises.

In broad terms, we think there are four possible outcomes to the on-going trade related negotiations between the US and China. These outcomes are:

  1. A compromise much akin to kicking the can down the road whereby China agrees to reduce its trade surplus with the US and increases its purchases of US products and services. Nothing else of material consequence is agreed upon and both parties make assurances of negotiating over unresolved matters in the near future.
  2. Both parties make some concessions and meaningful progress is made on trade, giving Corporate America greater access to the Chinese market and intellectual property theft by China.
  3. One of the two parties capitulates. In the case of China capitulating means agreeing to an overwhelming majority of the Trump Administration’s demands. While the US capitulating means most demands unrelated to the China’s bilateral trade surplus are dropped.
  4. There is no agreement and a hike in tariffs goes ahead as planned.

The type of hedge a portfolio may need depends on how said portfolio is positioned.

A portfolio positioned for an amicable resolution to the trade dispute needs hedges for the first and fourth scenarios briefly outlined above. While a portfolio positioned for a prolonged trade war requires hedges under the second and third scenarios.

Positioned for an Amicable Resolution

Given China’s ambitions on the technology front and the Trump Administrations to rein Chinese technological through use of national security measures and export controls, the semiconductor industry is likely to be a key battleground in the dispute.

Investors positioned for an amicable resolution to the trade dispute can hedge themselves, we think, by going long South Korean semiconductor companies — China will need to turn to them in the event export controls are imposed on US semiconductor companies. Investors can further hedge themselves by shorting Taiwanese semiconductor companies because, if China’s thirst for semiconductor supplies is as strong as we think it is, the risk of annexation of Taiwan by China to secure supply rises significantly in the event of a less-than-amicable end to the negotiations.

Positioned for a Prolonged Trade War

Investors positioned for a prolonged trade war can hedge themselves, we think, by going long US agriculture commodity producers — one of the simplest ways for China to shrink its bilateral trade surplus is to increase purchases of agricultural commodities from the US.

3-D Printing: Inflection Point?

At the beginning of 2018, Bugatti revealed it had developed the first series-production 3-D printed brake caliper for use in its vehicles. In December last year, the Volkswagen Group released a video of the finished product in action.

In October last year, Dutch robotics company MX3D completed the 3-D printing of a steel bridge and announced that it will be installing the bridge across a canal in Amsterdam during 2019. Two months later, the Marines from the 1st Marine Logistics Group at Camp Pendleton, California –  with the help of the Marine Corps Systems Command Advanced Manufacturing Operations Cell and the Army Corps of Engineers —  successfully 3-D printed a concrete bridge on site as opposed to in a factory setting.

NOWlab, the innovation arm of German additive manufacturing company BigRep, unveiled NERA — a fully 3D-printed motorcycle – in November 2018.  All parts of the motorcycle — excluding the electrical components that power the bike — have been 3-D printed, including the tyres, rims, frame and seat.

In January, Relativity Space — a rocket-building company founded by former SpaceX and Blue Origin employees — revealed that it has been granted permission by the US Air Force to launch its, almost entirely 3-D printed, rockets from Launch Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral in Florida. And just last week, UK-based space startup Orbex publicly unveiled its Prime rocket — the world’s largest 3-D printed rocket engine — at the opening of its new headquarters and rocket design facility in Forres in the Scottish Highlands.

The Innovation S-Curve

Many investors have turned their backs on 3-D printing after exhibiting irrational exuberance towards the technology over years past. After a failed promise of endless growth, and a bursting of the stock price bubble that sent shares of publicly traded 3-D printing companies tumbling, we wonder if interest in 3-D printing stocks may be rekindled as the potential benefits of the technology begin to be realised?

Everett Rogers, previously professor of communication studies at the University of New Mexico, popularised the theory of diffusion of innovations in his book Diffusion of Innovations. The theory is amongst the oldest theories in social science.

The theory postulates that the adoption of an innovation within a social system is determined by four factors, namely:

  1. The innovation itself;
  2. Communication channels;
  3. Time; and
  4. The characteristics of the social system.

Over the years,  the innovation S-curve has been popularised a means of measuring the adoption of existing technologies.  The innovation S-curve is an application of Professor Rogers’ theory.

S-Curves-New-Products.pngSource: ideagenius.com

3-D printing has gone through its early adoption phase. The recent delivery of a number of innovative solutions based on 3-D printing makes us wonder if 3-D printing technology is now at an inflection point within its innovation S-curve and ready to enter a phase of rapid growth? If indeed it is, many of the publicly listed 3-D printing stocks could, in a few years time, trade at many multiples of the prices they trade at today. 

3-D Printing Stocks

Below we highlight two 3-D printing related stocks that caught our attention upon initial screening,

The ExOne Company $XONE

$XONE is a micro-cap stock with market capitalisation of US dollars 172 million. Short interest in the stock is high at more than 27 per cent of free float.

The company  was spun-off from Extrude Hone Corporation, a global supplier of precision nontraditional machining processes, 2005.

$XONE is a global provider of 3-D printing machines, 3-D printed products and related services to industrial businesses operating across the aerospace, automotive, pumps, heavy equipment and energy industries. The company’s product and services offering revolves around industrial strength sand castings and moulds and directly printed metal parts.

Following a transition year in 2018, during which the company took measures to improve operating efficiencies and reel in costs,  the company’s management expects net income and operating cash flows to be positive in 2019. Further, the company will be introducing larger format 3-D printing machines during the year to increase the size of its addressable market and to up sell existing clients.

Stratasys Limited $SSYS

$SSYS has a market capitalisation of US dollars 1.4 billion. Short interest in the stock stands at almost 12 per cent of free float.

The company manufactures 3-D printers used by designers, engineers, and manufacturers for office-based prototyping and direct digital manufacturing to visualise, verify, and communicate product designs. Engineers, for example, use Stratasys systems to model complex geometries in a wide range of thermoplastic materials such as polycarbonate.

$SSYS’s CEO,  Ilan Levin, resigned in May 2018 and its Chairman has been serving as its interim CEO since. Levin’s exit came after the company posted losses of of almost US dollars 40 million in 2017 and US dollars 13 million during last year’s first quarter.

The company has been witnessing growth in 3-D printing system orders since the second quarter of last year and management expected this trend continue into 2019. They are also see their customers moving from experimenting with 3-D printing to deploying and expanding the capacity of these systems in true production environments.

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

The Hawks Have Not Left the Building

 

“Difficulties are meant to rouse, not discourage. The human spirit is to grow strong by conflict.” – William Ellery Channing

 

“Very few negotiations are begun and concluded in the same sitting. It’s really rare. In fact, if you sit down and actually complete your negotiation in one sitting, you left stuff on the table.” – Christopher Voss

 

The Hawks Have Not Left the Building

 

A “typical feature of conflicts is that […] the intergroup conflict tends to be exacerbated and perpetuated by intragroup conflicts: by internal conflicts within each of the two contending parties. Even when there is growing interest on both sides in finding a way out of the conflict, movement toward negotiations is hampered by conflicts between the “doves” and the “hawks” –or the “moderates” and “extremists” –within each community”.  So wrote Herbert C. Kelman, the Richard Clarke Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus at Harvard University, in Coalitions Across Conflict Lines: The Interplay of Conflicts and Between the Israeli and Palestinian Communities.

 

Kelman – renowned for his work in the Middle East and efforts to bring Israel and Palestine closer towards the goal of achieving peace in the Middle East – identifies, in the paper he authored in 1993, the “relationship between intergroup and intragroup conflict” as a key hurdle towards building coalitions across conflict lines. According to Kelman, “doves on the two sides and hawks on the two sides have common interests”. The hawks, unlike the doves, can pursue their interests without the need to coordinate with their counterparts on the opposing side. The hawks simply “by engaging in provocative actions or making threatening statements” reaffirm the enemy’s worst fears and embolden the hawks on the opposing side. The doves, on the other hand, “tend to be preoccupied with how their words will sound, and how their actions will look, at home, and with the immediate political consequences of what they say and do.” Therefore, the doves tend to take a more measured approach in communicating their views and underplay their side’s willingness to negotiate – the kind of behaviour that plays right into the hands of the hawks and reduces the effectiveness of the doves

 

Kelman’s recommendation to increase the chances of resolving a conflict by means of negotiation is to facilitate greater coordination between the doves on the opposing sides and minimise the involvement of the hawks.

 

The lessons from Professor Kelman’s work, we think, are highly relevant today. His insights provide a framework for determining the possibility of success in each round of negotiations between the US and China in resolving the on-going trade dispute.

 

Subsequent to the working dinner between President Trump and President Xi in Buenos Aires following the G20 summit, the headlines have focused on the temporary ceasefire in the trade dispute. President Trump has pledged to suspend the increase in tariffs on US dollars 200 billion of Chinese imports that was to go into effect on 1 January 2019 for a period of up to 90 days. In return President Xi has pledged that China will buy more US goods, ban exports of the opioid drug, and offered to reconsider the Qualcomm-NXP merger that failed to receive regulatory approval in China earlier in the year.

 

The three-month period, before the suspension of the tariff increase lapses, provides the two-sides a window of opportunity to initiate a new round of talks to tackle some of the more sensitive issues surrounding the trade dispute, including ownership and access to technology and intellectual property.

 

Despite the announcements lacking details, capital markets have reacted positively to the news of the temporary ceasefire and the Chinese yuan, on Monday, posted its largest single day gain since February 2016.

 

We are not surprised by the bare bones nature of the agreement following the meeting between President Trump and President Xi. The last minute inclusion of Peter Navarro, White House trade policy adviser and prominent China hawk, to the list of guests attending the working dinner was, at least to us, a clear signal that meaningful progress on trade relations during the meeting was unlikely. After all, Mr Navarro’s role in the Trump Administration, as The Atlantic puts it, is “to shepherd Trump’s more extreme ideas into reality, ensuring that the president’s convictions are not weakened as officials translate them from bully-pulpit shouts to negotiated legalese. He is the madman behind Trump’s “madman theory” approach to trade policy, there to make enemies and allies alike believe that the president can and will do anything to make America great again.”

 

Moreover, we do not expect a breakthrough in negotiations to materialise during the next round of talks between Washington and Beijing before the suspension of the increase in tariffs lapses. As long as hawks such as Peter Navarro and Robert E. Lighthizer continue to have President Trump’s ear our view is unlikely to change. If, however, the dovish members of the Trump Administration, such as Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin and Director of the National Economic Council Lawrence Kudlow, begin to take control of proceedings we would become much more hopeful of a positive resolution to the trade dispute.

 

For now, we see the temporary agreement between the two sides as providing much needed short-term respite for China. More importantly, we see President Trump’s offer of a temporary ceasefire without President Xi offering any concessions on sensitive issues, such as industrial policy, state funded subsidies and intellectual property rights, to be a symptom of the short-termism that seemingly besets democratically elected leaders without exception. Had the US equity capital markets not faltered recently and / or the Republicans not lost control of the House of Representatives, it is unlikely, we think, that President Trump would have been as acquiescent.

 

 

Liquidity Relief

 

In June in The Great Unwind and the Two Most Important Prices in the World we wrote:

 

“In the 362 months between end of May 1988 and today there have only been 81 months during which both the US 10-year treasury yield and the oil price have been above their respective 48-month moving averages – that is less than a quarter of the time.

 

Over the course of the last thirty years, the longest duration the two prices have concurrently been above their respective 48-month moving averages is the 25 month period between September 2005 and October 2007. Since May 1988, the two prices have only been above their respective 48-month moving averages for 5 or more consecutive months on only four other occasions: between (1) April and October 1996; (2) January and May 1995; (3) October 1999 and August 2000; and (4) July 2013 and August 2014.

 

Notably, annual global GDP growth has been negative on exactly five occasions since 1988 as well: 1997, 1998, 2001, 2009, and 2015. The squeeze due to sustainably high US interest rates and oil prices on the global economy is very real.”

 

We have updated the charts we presented alongside the above remarks and provide them below. (The periods during which both the US 10-year treasury yield and the oil price have been above their respective 48-month moving averages are shaded in grey in the two charts below.)

 

US 10-Year Treasury Yield10YSource: Bloomberg

 

West Texas Intermediate Crude (US dollars per barrel) WTISource: Bloomberg

 

The sharp drop in oil prices in recent weeks ended the 10 month streak of the 10-year Treasury yields and oil prices concurrently trading above their respective 48-month moving averages.

 

The recent drop in oil prices has coincided with the Fed weighing up the possibility of changing its policy guidance language. Several members of the Fed have suggested, according to the minutes of the FOMC’s November policy meeting, a “transition to statement language that [places] greater emphasis on the evaluation of incoming data in assessing the economic and policy outlook”. If the drop in oil prices sustains the data is likely soften and compel the Fed to dial back its hawkishness. With the base effects from the Trump Tax Cut also likely to recede in 2019, there is a distinct possibility that the Fed’s policy will be far less hawkish in 2019 than it has been over the course of 2018.

 

Lower (or range bound oil prices) and a more dovish Fed (even at the margin) are the conditions under which oil importing emerging markets tend to thrive. Although it is still too early to be sure, if oil prices fail to recover in the coming few months and the Fed is forced into a more dovish stance due to softer data, 2019 might just be the year to once again be long emerging markets.

 

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

Trade Wars: Clearing the Way for a War of Attrition

 

“The two most powerful warriors are patience and time.” – Leo Tolstoy

 

“The primary thing when you take a sword in your hands is your intention to cut the enemy, whatever the means. Whenever you parry, hit, spring, strike or touch the enemy’s cutting sword, you must cut the enemy in the same movement. It is essential to attain this. If you think only of hitting, springing, striking or touching the enemy, you will not be able actually to cut him.” – Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings

 

“Only an idiot tries to fight a war on two fronts, and only a madman tries to fight one on three.” – David Eddings, American novelist

 

A few updates relating to themes and topics we have written about in the recent past before we get to this week’s piece.

1. Two out of three companies we highlighted as potential value plays in Searching for Value in Retail in June have now announced that they are evaluating opportunities to go private.

The most recent of the announcements comes from Barnes & Noble $BKS which said on Wednesday that it is reviewing several offers to take the bookstore chain private. We are not surprised by this development and had expected as much when we wrote the following in June:

“Trading at a price to consensus forward earnings of around 10x and with a market capitalisation of under US dollars 500 million, $BKS remains a potential target for even the smallest of activist investors or private equity funds.”

The other company we discussed in the same piece was GameStop $GME, which at the start of September announced that it is engaged in discussions with third parties regarding a possible transaction to take the company private.

 

2. Following-up on Trucking: High Freight Rates and Record Truck Orders, orders for Class 8 semi-trucks increased 92 per cent year-over-year in September. Last month capped the highest ever recorded quarterly sales of big rigs in North America.

American trucking companies continue to struggle with tight capacity at the same time demand from the freight market remains strong.

We continue to play this theme through a long position in Allison Transmission $ALSN.

 

3. When the tech bubble popped at the start of the millennium, between 2001 and 2003, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ 100 indices declined by 31.3 and 57.9 per cent on a total return basis, respectively. During the same period, Cameco Corporation $CCJ, the world’s largest uranium miner by market capitalisation, went up by more than 40 per cent.

Yesterday, as we witnessed global equity markets sell-off in response to (depending on who you ask) (i) tightening central bank policies and rising yields raising concerns about economic growth prospects, (ii) the accelerating sell-off in bond markets, or (iii) news that China secretly hacked the world’s leading tech companies, including Amazon and Apple, $CCJ closed up 5 per cent on the day.

Maybe history as Mark Twain said rhymes, maybe it is nothing, or just maybe it is one more sign of the increasing awareness of the nascent bull market underway in uranium.

CCJ.PNG

 

4. With the recent sell-off in the bond market, long-term Treasury yields have surged. Yields on the ten-year treasuries rose as high as 3.23 per cent on Wednesday, recording their highest level since 2011.

Does this level in yields make the long-end of the curve attractive for investors to start to re-allocate some equity exposure to long-term Treasury bonds? We think not.

Our thinking is driven by the following passage from Henry Kaufman’s book Interest Rates, the Markets, and the New Financial World in which he considers, in 1985, the possibility that the secular bond bear market may have come to an end:

“[T]wo credit market developments force me to be somewhat uncertain about the secular trend of long-term rates. One is the near-term performance of institutional investors, who in the restructured markets of recent decades generally will not commit funds when long when short rates are rising. The other development is the continued large supply of intermediate and long-term Governments that is likely to be forthcoming during the next period of monetary restraint. There is a fair chance that long yields will stay below their secular peaks, but the certainty of such an event would be greatly advanced with a sharp slowing of U.S. Government bond issuance and with the emergence of intermediate and long-term investment decisions by portfolio managers.”

 

In August this year, the US Treasury announced increases to its issuance of bonds in response to the US government’s rising deficit. This is the very opposite of what Mr Kaufman saw as a catalyst for declining long-term yields in 1985. Moreover, this increased issuance is baked in without the passing of President Trump’s infrastructure spending plan, which has been temporarily shelved. We suspect that Mr Trump’s infrastructure spending ambitions are likely to return to the fore following the upcoming mid-term elections. If an infrastructure spending bill of the scale Mr Trump has alluded to in the past come to pass, US Treasury bond issuance is only likely to further accelerate.

With the window for US companies to benefit from an added tax break this year by maximising their pension contributions now having passed, it will be interesting to see if institutional investors now become reluctant to allocate additional capital to long-dated Treasury bonds due to rising short rates.

The relative flatness of the yield curve, in our opinion, certainly does not warrant taking on the duration risk. At the same time, we do not recommend a short position in long-dated treasuries either – the negative carry is simply too costly at current yields.

 

On to this week’s piece where we discuss the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, the new trade deal between the US, Canada and Mexico that replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, and its implications on the on-going trade dispute between the US and China.

The many months of the will-they-won’t-they circle of negotiations between the US, Canada and Mexico have culminated in the USMCA, which will replace NAFTA. The new deal may not be as transformative as the Trump Administration would have us believe but nonetheless has some important changes. Some of the salient features of the new agreement include:

 

1. Automobiles produced in the trade bloc will only qualify for zero tariffs if at least 75 per cent of their components are manufactured in Mexico, the US, or Canada versus 62.5 per cent under NAFTA.

The increased local component requirement is, we feel, far more to do with limiting indirect, tariff-free imports of Chinese products into the US than it is to do with promoting auto parts production in North America. The latter, we think, is an added benefit as opposed to the Trump Administration’s end goal.

 

2. Also relating to automobiles, the new agreement calls for 40 to 45 per cent of content to be produced by workers earning wages of at least US dollars 16 an hour by the year 2023.

This provision specifically targets the relative cost competitiveness of Mexico and is likely to appease Trump faithfuls hoping for policies aimed at stemming the flow of manufacturing jobs from the US to Mexico.

How this provision will be monitored remains anyone’s guess. Nonetheless, the USMCA, unlike NAFTA, does allow each country to sanction the others for labour violations that impact trade and therefore it may well become that the threat is used to coerce Mexico into complying with the minimum wage requirements.

 

3. Canada will improve the level of access to its dairy market afforded to the US. It will start with a six-month phase-in that allows US producers up to a 3.6 per cent share of the Canadian dairy market, which translates into approximately US dollars 70 million in increased exports for US farmers.

Canada also agreed to eliminate Class 7 – a Canada-wide domestic policy, creating a lower-priced class of industrial milk. The policy made certain categories of locally produced high-protein milk products cheaper than standard milk products from the US.

 

4. The term of a copyright will be increased from 50 years beyond the life of the author to 70 years beyond the life of the author. This amendment particularly benefits pharmaceutical and technology companies in the US. American companies’ investment in research and development far outstrips that made by their Canadian and Mexican peers

Another notable victory for pharmaceuticals is the increased protection for biologics patents from eight years to ten years.

 

5. NAFTA had an indefinite life; the USMCA will expire in 16 years.

The US, Canada and Mexico will formally review the agreement in six years to determine whether an extension beyond 16 years is warranted or not.

 

The successful conclusion of negotiations between the three countries, subject of course to Congressional approval, combined with the trade related truce declared with the European Union in the summer, should be seen as a victory for US Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer.

Earlier this year, in AIG, Robert E. Lighthizer, Made in China 2025, and the Semiconductors Bull Market we wrote (emphasis added):

 

Mr Lighthizer’s primary objectives with respect to US-Sino trade relations are (1) for China to open up its economy – by removing tariffs and ownership limits – for the benefit of Corporate America and (2) to put an end to Chinese practices that erode the competitive advantages enjoyed by US corporations – practices such as forcing technology transfer as a condition for market access.

Mr Lighthizer’s goals are ambitious. They will require time and patience from everyone – including President Trump, Chinese officials, US allies, and investors. For that, he will need to focus Mr Trump’s attention on China. He will not want the President continuing his thus far ad hoc approach to US trade policy. If NAFTA and other trade deals under negotiations with allies such as South Korea are dealt with swiftly, we would take that as a clear signal that Mr Lighthizer is in control of driving US trade policy.

 

Mr Trump and his band of trade warriors and security hawks are now in the clear to focus their attention on China and deal with the threat it poses to the US’s global economic, military and technological leadership.

 

The Big Hack

On Thursday, Bloomberg Businessweek ran a ground breaking story confirming the Trump Administration’s fears relating to Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft. The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies details how Chinese spies hacked some of the leading American technology companies, including the likes of Apple and Amazon, and compromised their supply chains.

Bloomberg’s revelations were swiftly followed by strongly worded denials by Apple and Amazon.

The timing of Bloomberg’s report – coming so soon after the USMCA negotiations were completed successfully – regardless of whether the allegations are true or not is notable.

Coincidentally, also on Thursday, Vice President Pence, in a speech at the Hudson Institute, criticised China on a broad range of issues, from Beijing’s supposed meddling in US elections, unfair trade practices, espionage, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

American Corporate Interests

The main hurdle for the Trump Administration in its dispute with China is the US dollars 250 billion invested in China by Corporate America.

We see the recent moves by the Administration in upping the ante on China, by disseminating the theft and espionage narrative through the media and new rounds of tariffs, as a means to provoke Corporate America to begin reengineering its supply chains away from China. Whether this happens, and at what the cost will be, remains to be seen.

 

War of Attrition

We expect US-China tensions to continue to escalate especially as we draw closer to mid-term election. And the Trump Administration to (threaten to) impose higher tariffs and use other economic and non-economic measures to pressurise the Chinese. The only near term reprieves we see from the US side are (i) a resounding defeat for the Republicans in the mid-term elections (not our base case) or (ii) a re-assessment of priorities by the Trump Administration following the elections.

From the Chinese perspective, the short-term impact of tariffs has partially been offset by the ~10 per cent fall in the renminbi’s value against the US dollar since April. A continued depreciation of the renminbi can further offset the impact of tariffs in the short run – for now this is not our base case.

The other alternative for Beijing is to stimulate its economy through infrastructure and housing investment to offset the external shock à la 2009 and 2015. However, given that Xi Jinping highlighted deleveraging as a key policy objective at the 19th National Congress, we expect fiscal stimulus to remain constrained until is absolutely necessary.

For now our base case is for China to continue to buy time with the President Trump and at the same time for it to work on deepening its economic and political ties in Asia, with its allies and the victims of a weaponised dollar.

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

Continued Strength in the US Dollar | China’s Line in the Sand | Germany Between a Rock and a Hard Place

 

“One benefit of summer was that each day we had more light to read by” – Jeanette Walls, American author and journalist

 

“The best of us must sometimes eat our words.” – J. K. Rowling

 

“Increasingly, the Chinese will own a lot more of the world because they will be converting their dollar reserves and U.S. government bonds into real assets.” – George Soros

 

We have a mixed bag here for you this week folks with commentary on:

  • The strength in the US dollar
  • China’s response to Trump’s latest threats to escalate the trade war
  • Germany’s energy needs placing it between a rock and a hard place

 

Continued strength in the US dollar

A number of you have messaged us about the recent strength in the US dollar and our take on it. For the benefit of all readers, we briefly wanted to touch upon where we stand after the latest move higher by the greenback.

Back in March – Currency Markets: “You can’t put the toothpaste back in the tube” – we wrote:

 

The major central banks of the world are now in a competitive game. While markets may enter an interim phase where the Fed’s hawkish posturing leads to a strengthening dollar, this phase, in our opinion, is likely to be short-lived.

 

The line in the sand beyond which we would consider our view to be invalidated is a sustained move above 96 on the US dollar index.

 

At the time we wrote the above, we were unaware of how or why the 96 level was going to prove to be a significant level for the US dollar. However, we felt that psychologically it was a critical level for market participants. The dramatic plunge in the Turkish lira today, the sentiment being displayed across key media outlets and the general tone on Twitter all seem to validate that around 96 on the DXY is indeed an important level.

For now all we would add is that we are in wait and see mode. If the US dollar continues to move higher or remains above the 96 for a prolonged period (6 to 8 weeks), we would have to accept that our bearish view on the US dollar was wrong. If, however, the greenback fails to sustain above 96 we would likely look to put on carry trades in emerging market currencies and go long the euro and Japanese yen.

Until we have more clarity we will remain on the side lines.

 

China’s Line in the Sand

Last week, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) imposed a reserve requirement of 20 per cent on some trading of foreign-exchange forward contracts, effectively increasing the cost of shorting the Chinese yuan. The move has offset some of the pressure from President Trump’s threats to further escalate the trade war and has brought stability to the currency.

Official statements indicate that the PBoC made the move to reduce both “macro financial risks” and the volatility in foreign exchange markets.  To us the move by the PBoC, however, suggests that China is not yet ready to trigger a sharp devaluation of its currency in the trade war with the US.

What is more confounding, however, is figuring out what China can do to respond to the threats of further escalation of the trade war by the Trump Administration. Initially China tried to appease Mr Trump by:

  • Lavishly hosting him in China;
  • Offering to increase imports from the US to reduce its trade surplus;
  • Proposing to gradually opening its local markets to US corporations; and even
  • Engaging in commercial dealings in favours of Mr Trump’s family;

Failing at that, China has tried to respond by:

However, China’s retaliatory efforts have not swayed Mr Trump either.

The problem, as we described in Trade Wars: Lessons from History, is one of creed:

 

President Trump and his band of trade warriors are hell-bent on stopping the Chinese from moving up the manufacturing value chain.

 

Alexander Hamilton understood that America’s long-term stability hinged upon its transition from an agrarian to industrial society, the Chinese leadership deeply appreciates the need to transition its economy from being the toll manufacturer of global industry to playing a leading role in the high-tech industries of tomorrow.

 

The only way we see the Trump Administration relenting in its push to corner the Chinese is if Trump the “dealmaker” takes control of proceedings. That is, in his desire to make a deal and claim victory, President Trump tells his band of trade warriors and security hawks to take a backseat and instead strikes a deal with China that involves a combination of China buying more from the US and opening up its markets to more foreign ownership (something we suspect China wants to do any way, but on its own terms).

 

Germany: Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place

President Trump began his visit to the annual summit of NATO allies in June this year by breaking from diplomatic protocol and verbally attacking Germany:

 

“We’re supposed to protect you from Russia, but Germany is making pipeline deals with Russia. You tell me if that’s appropriate. Explain that.”

 

In May 2011 Germany decided to abandon nuclear power in favour of greener sources of energy such as wind and solar. Nuclear power accounted for almost a fifth of Germany’s national electricity supply at the time Chancellor Angela Merkel announced plans to mothball the country’s 17 nuclear power stations by 2022 following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011.

Germany, however, failed in its attempt at adequately fulfilling a greater proportion of its energy needs through alternative sources of renewable energy. And the direct consequence of Chancellor Merkel’s decision to drop nuclear power has been that Germany has become increasingly dependent on Russia’s plentiful natural gas supplies.

Germany has a difficult decision to make. Does it choose to maintain its geopolitical alliance with the US and abstain from Russian gas or does it choose cheap gas and re-align itself geopolitically?

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas’ interview on 9 August suggests that Germany may well be leaning towards the latter (emphasis added):

 

“Yes, in future we Europeans will have to look out for ourselves more. We’re working on it. The European Union has to finally get itself ready for a common foreign policy. The principle of unanimity in line with which the European Union makes its foreign policy decisions renders us incapable of taking action on many issues. We’re in the process of transforming the European Union into a genuine security and defence union. We remain convinced that we need more and not less Europe at this time.”

 

Russia is under US sanctions. China is under pressure from the US. And now Germany – in no small part due to its massive trade surplus with the US – finds itself in the cross-hairs.

What if Russia, China and Germany were to form an economic, and dare we ask political, alliance? Something that would have seemed far-fetched less than a year ago, does not seem to sound so crazy anymore.

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. 

A Week of Plenty: Parsing the Big and the Small

 

“A lot happens in our everyday life, but it always happens within the same routine, and more than anything else it has changed my perspective of time. For, while previously I saw time as a stretch of terrain that had to be covered, with the future as a distant prospect, hopefully a bright one, and never boring at any rate, now it is interwoven with our life here and in a totally different way. Were I to portray this with a visual image it would have to be that of a boat in a lock: life is slowly and ineluctably raised by time seeping in from all sides. Apart from the details, everything is always the same. And with every passing day the desire grows for the moment when life will reach the top, for the moment when the sluice gates open and life finally moves on.” – Karl Ove Knausgård, Norwegian novelist

 

There are a lot of interesting and market moving developments that have either transpired or come to light over the course of the last week or so. This week we take a break from taking a deep(ish)-dive into a given theme and instead parse through some of these developments.

 

US Market Breadth

 As US markets have recovered and moved within a whisker of the year-to-date highs recorded in January, we have witnessed a growing chorus of criticism on the robustness of the recent rally. One of the more common criticisms is how only a handful of stocks – namely Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google, Microsoft and Salesforce.com – are responsible for the positive returns of the S&P500 Index year to date and were it not for these stocks, the market would be in the red.

To that we counter with two pieces of evidence.

The equally weighted index of the constituents of the S&P500 Index, as of Wednesday’s close, is 2.3 per cent from its January highs.

SPW Index (S&P 500 Equal Weighte 2018-07-26 13-45-34.jpg

 

The equally weighted index of the constituents of the Nasdaq 100 Index, as of Wednesday’s close, is above its January highs.

NDXE Index (NASDAQ 100 Equal Wei 2018-07-26 13-47-07

 

There have been and continue to be plenty of opportunities to outperform the broad market indices without the need to invest in the FAANG or other large cap tech stocks. You just need to do the work.

There are of course other criticisms including valuations, such as price-to-sales and price-to-earnings multiples, and the near record high net profit margins being achieved by companies, which critics argue should all mean revert over time and said reversion should lead to a sharp drop stock prices.

With respect to valuations, we counter with two arguments: (1) valuations can mean revert by either prices dropping or sales / earnings increasing, as the quarterly results of the current reporting season have demonstrated, valuations in many instances are adjusting on higher sales and / or earnings; and (2) rich valuations are not in and of themselves a precursor for market corrections, rich valuations are a necessary condition for equity market corrections but not a concurrent one.

Turning to record high profit margins as a bearish argument against owning US stocks, we counter that such arguments do not adjust for the change in the composition of major US equity market indices. Once the S&P500 Index, for example, is adjusted for the changes in sector weights, profit margins do not appear to be anywhere near as high as they appear to be without adjusting the index for changes in sector allocations. This is because the current heavyweights of the index, namely tech and healthcare stocks, tend to generate much higher margins than businesses in other sectors that dominated index historically.

The changes in the composition of the index also go some way to explaining the high level of the price-to-sales ratio the market is trading at – at risk of stating the obvious, higher margin businesses capture much more of their sales as profits than do lower margin businesses, and thus high margin businesses are bound to trade at higher multiples of sales than do low margin businesses.

 

 Is Amazon the biggest threat to Google’s dominance in search-driven advertising?

Quoting Brian Olsavsky, Amazon’s chief financial officer, from the company’s quarterly earnings update:

 “A big contributor to the quarter and the last few quarters obviously has been strong growth in our highest profitability businesses and also advertising.”

The CFO further added that Amazon is working to automate tasks for advertisers and to help media buyers measure the results.

Last quarter, Amazon’s revenue from the advertising sales category and some other items grew 132 per cent year-over-year to US dollars 2.2 billion. Quarterly revenue of over US dollars 2 billion is not to be scoffed at. More importantly, this revenue is coming straight out of Google’s share of the advertising market.

The appeal of advertising on Amazon for advertisers is obvious: customers searching on Amazon are already there with the intent of buying something. With Amazon controlling close to 45 per cent of total online sales in the US and perpetually increasing its product offering, it becomes progressively more convenient for online shoppers to begin their product searches with Amazon and not Google. If the propensity of consumers to being their product searches with Amazon over Google continues to increase, the proclivity of advertisers to spend their dollars on Amazon over Google is also likely to follow suit.

How Google responds to this challenge is something we await with much intrigue.

We expect Amazon to be the first company to achieve a trillion dollar market capitalisation.

 

Japanese Government Bonds

Global bond markets have been roiled by speculation that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is considering tweaking its policy stance and could scale back its stimulus programme. Yields on 10-year Japanese government hit a fresh twelve-month high on Thursday, forcing the BoJ’s in making a rare intervention in the bond market to push yields on the 10-year government bonds back below 10 basis points.

In practical terms, the BoJ currently guides the yields on 10 year government bonds to be within the range of 0 to 11 basis points. The official directive, however, only states that “The Bank will purchase Japanese government bonds (JGBs) so that 10-year JGB yields will remain at around zero percent.”

We are of the opinion that the BoJ will take steps to widen the tight range of 0 to 11 basis points on 10-year government bonds associated with the ‘around zero’ directive. The objective of said widening being to allow Japanese banks to have more influence on 10-year rates and to steepen the curve ever so slightly to enable them to make their lending activities profitable.

 

 Qualcomm / NXP Semiconductor

The two-year saga of Qualcomm’s attempted acquisition of Dutch chipmaker NXP Semiconductors came to an abrupt end after the deal failed to receive final approval from Chinese regulators ahead of the expiration of the companies’ agreement on Wednesday night. Had the transaction gone through, it would have been the semiconductor industry’s largest ever acquisition.

Unquestionably, the Qualcomm-NXP deal is collateral damage in the political game between Beijing and Washington and can be seen as retaliation for President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports.

After Congress, earlier this month, decided against re-imposing a seven-year ban on ZTE, the Chinese telecommunications equipment and systems company, from buying equipment in the US market — a move that would have effectively put the Chinese firm out of business, it was widely expected that China would have cleared the Qualcomm-NXP deal quid pro quo. By effectively ending the Qualcomm-NXP deal, however, the Chinese leadership is essentially adopting an extremely hawkish strategy toward the US.

We believe the Chinese move to end the Qualcomm-NXP deal is a significant escalation of trade-related tensions with the US, and see it is as weakening the position of dovish officials on both sides: in this case, Steve Mnuchin for the US and Liu He for the Chinese. This should only further complicate US-China trade related negotiations.

 

Trump-Juncker Meeting and the Prospect of Improved US-EU Trade Relations

In a joint announcement after meetings in Washington on Wednesday, President Donald Trump and the EU’s Jean-Claude Juncker declared a truce on trade-related tensions with the aim of eliminating all tariffs, trade barriers and subsidies related to non-auto industrial goods.

The rosiest outcome, from the perspective of the global economy, following this joint declaration is that President Trump seeks to settle the US trade-related tensions with the EU, Canada and Mexico, and instead focuses his energy on China – something Peter Navarro, Robert Lighthizer and other security and trade hawks in the administration have probably wanted all along.

If the rosy scenario does indeed materialise then the EU is likely to join in on US efforts to back against China’s efforts to move up the industrial value, discriminatory tariffs and abuse of intellectual property rights. The US-China trade-related tensions would escalate and Qualcomm’s failed acquisition of NXP would not be the last casualty in this spat. Every major US and Chinese company and asset would become fair game and everyone loses – China more than the US we suspect.

Earlier this year, President Trump announced broad based tariffs on steel and aluminium imports. Following the announcement, however, there were clear signals given by his administration that many of the US’s allies would be granted exemptions. Given that this not only did  not happen but that the tariffs were fully imposed on US allies, we assign a very low probability to the rosy scenario materialising.

Instead, we expect Mr Trump to keep upping the ante on trade, irrespective of the counterparty, right up until the mid-term elections. And only expect a coherent strategy on trade to materialise after the elections.

 

 Uranium: Extension of Cameco’s Facility Shutdowns

In November last year, Cameco Corporation, the world’s largest publicly traded uranium mining company, announced that it was temporarily suspending production at two of its northern Saskatchewan facilities – Key Lake and McArthur River – for a period of ten months. The decision was driven by the oversupply of uranium and low market prices that have persisted ever since Japan shut down its nuclear reactors following the radiation leaks at Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 2011.

Taking Cameco’s lead, Kazatomprom – Kazakhstan’s state-owned uranium mining company and the world’s largest natural uranium producer – announced in December last year that it would cut production by 20 per cent, representing 7.5 per cent of total global supply, over the next three years.

The impact of these two announcements was to send both uranium spot prices and share prices of listed uranium miners sharply higher. The euphoria did not last long, however. Spot prices gradually drifted lower, falling from just under US dollars 25 per pound at the start of the year to under US dollars 21 per pound by late April.  And the stock prices of many of the uranium miners fell below where they traded prior to Cameco’s announcement in November.

As spot prices fell, expectations that Cameco would extend the shutdown of its two Saskatchewan facilities started to grow. And Cameco has not disappointed, announcing on Wednesday after market, along with its quarterly results, that it would be suspending production at the two mines ‘indefinitely’ and does not plan to resume production at the site until the company can commit its ‘production under long-term contracts that provide an acceptable rate of return’.

The corollary of the extended suspension is that Cameco will be a buyer of up to 14 million pounds of uranium from the spot market (or otherwise) over the next 18 months to fulfil its commitments under on-going contracts.

Prior to their quarterly earnings call on Thursday morning, Cameco’s shares in pre-market trading were marked at 7 plus per cent below their closing price on Wednesday evening. Cameco shares closed up 3.4 per cent by end of trading on Thursday and spot uranium prices jumped 6.2 per cent to year-to-date highs at US dollars 25.65 per pound.

The malaise in the uranium sector may turn out to be much worse than Cameco’s management anticipating and the rally in the spot could well prove to be fleeting once again. If, however, uranium spot prices can push above US dollar 26.25 per pound, the highs recorded in 2017, they have significant room to run much higher.

For now we remain long select uranium miners as well as commodity pure play Uranium Participation Corporation $URPTF.

 

 

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.

Trade Wars: Lessons from History

 

“There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know.” – Harry Truman

 

“Give us a protective tariff and we will have the greatest nation on earth” – Abraham Lincoln

 

“If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilisation, it expects what never was and never will be.” – Thomas Jefferson

 

At the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow last week, France defeated Croatia in the final of 2018 FIFA World Cup. As the French toasted their second FIFA World Cup triumph, pundit upon pundit and football fan after football fan debated the manner of France’s victory and the controversial decisions that went France’s way. Our small group of friends and colleagues also got caught up in a debate on whether the referee rightly or wrongly rewarded the penalty that led to France’s second goal. Our debate was not limited to those of us that watched the match together but rather extended to our WhatsApp groups and roped in friends from all over the world.

It is often said that it is human nature to see what we want to see and ignore that which goes against our expectations.

As our arguments for and against the penalty went round and round in circles, we decided to watch replays of the incident from the match to try and settle which side of the debate had more merit. The funny thing is as we watched the replays the conviction levels on either side of the debate became even stronger. By some means what each of us saw, or at least thought we saw, reaffirmed our predisposition.

Of course, whether it was a penalty or not (it wasn’t) does not really matter. The record books will show that the French defeated the Croats by four goals to two. There will be no asterisk next to the record to note that arm chair fan Joe Schmoe disputed the validity of France’s victory due to the award of a dubious penalty.

Reflecting upon the harmless nature of our argument, we think of the oft quoted words of Winston Churchill:

“Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

Powerful statements can often hide as much as they reveal.

Can we learn what actually happened from studying history? Unlike the final score of a football match, the record of any past event that cannot be definitively quantified is likely to be clouded by the prejudices of historians and distorted by our individual partisanship.  And if we do not truly know what happened, can we really be doomed to repeat it?

Reality or not, below we examine the recorded history of American protectionism, reflect upon the successful adoption of the ‘American System’ by China and consider the possible outcomes of the rising trade-related tensions between the US and China.

 

American Independence and British Retaliation

On 18 April 1775, a clash between the British redcoats and the local militia at Lexington, Massachusetts, led to the fighting that began the American War of Independence.

Fifteen months after fighting began the American colonists claimed independence from the British and Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence.

The British did not take the colonists’ declaration lying down and made attempts to forcibly regain control over America. Economic warfare was one of the tools used by the British to inflict pain upon the Americans.

Britain closed off its markets to American trade by raising tariffs on American manufactured goods. US exports to England and its colonies fell from an estimated 75 per cent of total exports prior to the Declaration of Independence to around 10 per cent after it. The sharp fall in trade brought on an economic depression in the US.

Britain did not stop at just tariffs. It wanted to halt the US’s transformation from its agrarian roots to an industrialised nation and in this pursuit it went as far as outlawing skilled craftsmen from overseas travel and banning the export of patented machinery.

 

The American System

The American System, also known as the American School of Economics, is an economic plan based on the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, which guided the US national economic policy from first half of the 19th century till the early 1970s. The system is widely credited as having underpinned the US’s transformation from an agrarian frontier society to global economic powerhouse.

The American System is rooted in the mercantilist principles presented by Alexander Hamilton to Congress in December 1791 in the Report on the Subject of Manufactures. The three basic guiding economic principles of the system demanded the US Government to:

  1. Promote and protect American industries by selectively imposing high import tariffs and / or subsidising American manufacturers;
  2. Create a national bank to oversee monetary policy, stabilise the currency and regulate the issuance of credit by state and local banks; and
  3. Make internal improvements by investing in public infrastructure – including but not limited to roads, canals, public schools, scientific research, and sea ports – to facilitate domestic commerce and economic development.

These guiding principles are based on Alexander Hamilton’s insight that long-term American prosperity could not be achieved with an economy dependent purely on the financial and resource extraction sectors. And that economic self-sufficiency hinged upon the US Government intervening to protect and to support the development of captive manufacturing capabilities.

Alexander Hamilton’s ideas were not immediately accepted by Congress – Congress was dominated by Southern planters, many of whom favoured free trade. One Thomas Jefferson, in particular, vehemently opposed Hamilton’s protectionist proposals.

Congress and Jefferson became much more receptive to Hamilton’s ideas in the aftermath of the Anglo-American War of 1812, during which the British burnt down the White House. The government’s need for revenue and a surge in anti-British fervour, in no small part, made favouring Hamilton’s proposals politically expedient for Congress.

In 1816 Congress passed an import tariff, known as the Dallas Tariff, with the explicit objective of protecting American manufacturers and making European imported goods more expensive. The legislation placed import duties of 25 per cent on cotton and wool textiles and manufactured iron; 30 per cent on paper and leather goods and hats; and 15 per cent on most other imported products. Two years later, and in response to predatory dumping of goods by the British, Congress further increased import duties.

American industry blossomed after the imposition of tariffs and vested interests lobbied to keep or even increase import duties. With the public strongly in support, Congress continued raising tariffs and American import duties rose to around 40 per cent on average by 1820.

Also in 1816, Congress created the “The President, Directors, and Company, of the Bank of the United States”, commonly referred to as the Second Bank of the United States, and President James Madison gave it a 20-year charter to handle all fiscal transactions for the US Government, regulate the public credit issued by private banking institutions, and to establish a sound and stable national currency.

The third and final tenet of the American System, federally funded internal improvements, was never fully adopted. Nonetheless, the US Government did end up using a part of the revenues generated from the import duties and the sale of public lands in the west to subsidise the construction of roads, canals and other public infrastructure.

Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and many of the other great leaders from American history supported the American System. That is, they were all protectionists. Republican protectionist instincts used to be so ingrained that even if there was the slightest liberalisation of trade made by the Democrats, it would be reversed as soon as the Republican regained power. For instance the Revenue Act of 1913, passed during the early days of President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, which lowered basic tariff rates from 40 to 25 per cent, was almost entirely reversed after Republicans regained power following World War I.

It is only as recently as 1952, upon the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower, do we find a notable Republican leader that favoured free trade over protectionism.

Coincidentally, or not, President Eisenhower’s willingness to betray the Republican protectionist heritage in favour of free trade policies just so happened to be around the same time funding of the Marshall Plan ended. By 1952, the economy of every participant state in the Marshall Plan had surpassed pre-war levels; economic output in 1951 of each and every participant exceeded their respective output in 1938 by at least 35 per cent.

Happenstance or not, the economic recovery of Western Europe and its growing alliance with the US, created powerful inducements to free trade and overall wealth creation.

 

China’s Adoption of The American System

In 1978, China initiated the transformation of its economy towards a more liberal and market-based regime. The reforms, as it would become glaringly apparent over the following decades, were predicated on promoting exports over imports by adopting a combination of mercantilist and protectionist policies. The government supported exporters by waiving duties on materials imported for export purposes, creating dedicated export-processing zones, and granting favourably priced loans for capital investment. At the same time, the government supported the creation of national champions and industry leaders by limiting (or altogether prohibiting) foreign participation in strategic industries. These steps were in adherence with the first tenet of the American System.

The Chinese government also tightly managed monetary policy and kept its currency artificially undervalued through the combination of capital controls and intervention, driving capital exports and the build-up of trade surpluses – the second tenet.

A significant portion of government directed investment in China, especially since the early 1990s, has been in increasing the amount and improving the quality of public infrastructure. Investment was directed into all forms of public infrastructure including but not limited to developing power and telecommunications networks, public buildings, dams, rural road networks, manufacturing facilities, and academic institutions – the third tenet.

Much as the US economy flourished under the mercantilist tenets of the American System, China too has flourished over the last four decades by adopting the very same system.

Just as the Republicans in America were willing to make a turn toward free trade as the global economic environment became conducive to a US led global order, the Chinese leadership is beginning to espouse the virtues of free trade as its version of the Marshall Plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, gathers steam.

The Chinese leadership has guided its economy to such great heights based on, we suspect, their acute understanding of American economic history. It is China’s demonstrated adherence to the American System, which leads us to believe that just as Alexander Hamilton understood that America’s long-term stability hinged upon its transition from an agrarian to industrial society, the Chinese leadership deeply appreciates the need to transition its economy from being the toll manufacturer of global industry to playing a leading role in the high-tech industries of tomorrow.

 

Investment Perspective

 

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and his cabinet unveiled the “Made in China 2025” strategic plan in May 2015. The plan lays out a roadmap for China take leadership role in 12 strategic high-tech industries and to move up the manufacturing value chain. The Council on Foreign Relations believes Made in China 2025 is a “real existential threat to US technological leadership”.

Just as the British insisted upon the US remaining an agrarian society in the 18th century, President Trump and his band of trade warriors are hell-bent on stopping the Chinese from moving up the manufacturing value chain. Short of going to war, the Trump Administration is even following the same playbook by imposing tariffs, blocking technology transfer and withholding intellectual property.

President Trump, however, appears ready to go further and even upend the global trade system and call into question the US dollar’s global reserve currency status. Mr Trump’s stated objective is to revive the US’s industrial base. This objective, however, is unachievable in a global trade system in which the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency. The privilege of having the world’s reserve currency comes with the responsibility of consistently running current account deficits and providing liquidity to the rest of the world.

 

Imposition of Tariffs

Unlike any other currency, the global reserve currency cannot be easily devalued. As we discussed in Don’t wait for the US Dollar Rally, its Already Happened, as the US dollar weakens international demand for the greenback increases. For this reason, it is probably easier for the US to pursue alternative means that have the same effect as a devaluation of its currency.

The imposition of tariffs, from foreign manufacturers’ perspective, is the equivalent of a devaluation of the US dollar. For US based buyers and consumers, tariffs lower the relative prices of US manufactured goods with respect to foreign manufactured goods. Tariffs, however, are only effective if their imposition does not result in an equivalent relative increase in the price of the US dollar. It is perhaps no coincidence then that the Chinese yuan started to tumble as soon as the US moved to impose tariffs on Chinese goods. And in response Mr Trump is turning on the Fed and its tightening of monetary policy.

 

The Nuclear Option

Mr Trump always has the nuclear option in his bid to revive industry in the US. He can attempt to overturn the global trade system and the status of US dollar as the world’s reserve currency by limiting the amount of US dollar available to the rest of the world – pseudo-capital controls. If this were to happen, any and every foreign entity or nation that is short US dollars (has borrowed in US dollars) will suffer from an almighty short squeeze. In response, China specifically would have to take one of two paths:

  1. Open up its economy to foreign investment and sell assets to US corporations to raise US dollars.
  2. Loosen capital controls to allow the settlement of trade in yuan.

 

A G2 Compromise

The final, and in our minds the most painless, alternative to the above scenarios is that of a G2 compromise i.e. China and the US come to an agreement of sorts that results in China making significant concessions in return for the US maintaining the current global trade system.

What such a compromise will look like we do not know but it most definitely involves a weakening of the US dollar.

 

This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.