“As the financial experts all over the world use machines to unwind Gordian knots of financial arrangements so complex that only machines can make – ‘derive’ – and trade them, we have to wonder: Are we living in a bad sci-fi movie? Is the Matrix made of credit default swaps?” — Richard Dooling
Legend has it that Alexander the Great, travelling through the Persian Empire during the fourth century before Christ, learned of an ox-cart in the city of Gordium belonging to its former king, Gordias. The ox-cart was tightly secured to a pillar in the centre of the acropolis using an intricate knot — in what is known today as a Gordian knot.
An oracle from Gordium had declared that any man who could unravel the elaborate knot securing the ox-cart was destined to become ruler of all of Asia. Many men of skill had attempted to untie the knot, but none succeeded.
Alexander the Great too failed in his initial attempts to unravel the knot. After reflecting on how tight the knot was, he drew his sword and sliced it in half with one stroke. Then it is said that he declared, “Destiny is not something brought about by legend, but by clearing away with one’s sword.”
The Spectre of Capital Destruction
The three major central banks in the developed world — namely the US Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan and European Central Bank — have failed thus far to unravel the knot of deflation that has inhibited the global economy from achieving escape velocity. Their attempts to unshackle the global economy from deflationary forces have primarily entailed lower, and in some cases negative, interest rates.
Low (real) interest rates for an extended period, however, lead to the emergence of a different type of risk: the permanent loss of capital.
The US has suffered from destruction of capital following a prolonged period of suppressed interest rates on three occasions over the last 100 years: 1929, 1966 and 2000. On a total return basis, it took on average 15 years for US markets to recover from these major draw downs.
Japan has had one episode of capital destruction, starting in 1989, and has hitherto been unable to recover the entirety of the lost capital. In Europe, Italy started experience permanent loss of capital in 2008 and still remains a long way from regaining the highs.
The common theme across all these episodes of capital destruction has been the banking sector, in the respective economies, becoming insolvent, if not suffering from outright bankruptcy.
Maintaining low interest rates over a prolonged period may propel risk appetite and reduce volatility for a while but eventually such a policy increases the risk of a permanent loss of capital. Central banks’s repeated experiments with low rates have demonstrated that low rates lead to higher asset prices, higher indebtedness, lower capital investment and lower productivity. Asset owners get richer. The asset poor get poorer, and that leads to the emergence of populism and the problems that come with it.
The question then arises, after more than a decade of low interest rates, where does the greatest risk of a permanent loss of capital lie today? We think it is not in the US, not in China, not in Latin America, and not even in Italy but rather in Germany. For Germany has not only enjoyed an extended period of low interest rates but also of an artificially undervalued currency. The scale of malinvestment in Germany, particularly in the automotive sector, is likely to be staggering.
If and when the tide goes out, we suspect the level of capital destruction in Germany will prove to be unprecedented.
The Inverted Yield Curve
The recent inversion of the US yield curve has sent alarm bells ringing for an impending recession in the US, and by extension, of a global recession. We are, however, not yet worried about an imminent recession in the US for the following reasons:
1. Bond yields remain low everywhere. In the US, real yields are now back at 0.7 per cent and should not be a drag on the economy.
2. While corporate debt is at record levels, corporate spreads remain within their historical range, after a brief rip higher at the back end of last year.
3. Oil, on a year-over-year basis, is lower and is soaking up less liquidity on the margin.
4. The US dollar has been range bound, neither adding to nor detracting from global liquidity.
Given the above, we think the recent economic softness in the US is likely to prove to be nothing more than a pause. The US economy is already stabilising. The Atlanta Fed has revised up its estimate for first quarter GDP growth to 2.1 per cent and indicators such as mortgage applications, PMI readings and durable goods orders also indicate the same. We expect economic activity to continue picking up through the second and third quarters of 2019 underpinned by the Fed’s dovish stance, the release of dollar liquidity by the US Treasury and less tight, if not outright easy, monetary and fiscal policy in China.
And if growth does pick up, why should around US dollars 10 trillion of global sovereign debt trade at negative yields?
Our core view is that just as global yield curves have witnessed a rapid flattening in recent months, the realisation that US, and by extension global, growth is picking up again is likely to trigger a sudden sharp steepening of yield curves. We see global equity markets, after their near record performance during the first quarter of the year, confirming as much. And there are more supporting signs such as rising copper prices and the inability of non-cyclical stocks to outperform cyclical stocks.
We expect those long duration to be nursing significant losses in second half of 2019.
What Could Push Bonds Yields Lower?
Given our repeated calls for a cyclical bottoming in long-terms yields, it is only prudent for us to consider a scenario, or scenarios, under which yields could yet go lower.
One such scenario that worries us that of a deflationary bust led by China.
Over the course of the last three decades, China has gone through the biggest capital spending boom in recorded history. All through this period, the driver of the Chinese economy has been capital spending more so than consumption. And China has not fueled this capital spending boom alone rather economies such as Australia, Brazil, Germany and South Korea have directly benefited from and contributed to the China led capital spending boom of the last thirty plus years.
If there is a deeper than anticipated slowdown in China that brings about an end to the structural ascent in global capital spending, then obviously investors should be positioning portfolios to be long duration and other yielding assets.
A China led deflationary bust, at least in the next 24 to 36 months, is not our base case view. Rather, we believe, that the steps taken by the Chinese leadership in the last 5 years have led to a curtailment of significant amounts of excess production capacities — the evidence of which can be found in, for example, the resilience of steel prices. Moreover, with China’s belt and road ambitions and the developed world’s seeming desire to wean itself off Chinese supplies, we are more concerned with the prospect of global capacities being insufficient to satisfy future demand than that of a deflationary bust.
This post should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation to purchase any particular security, strategy or investment product. References to specific securities and issuers are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.








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